Special Standing Committee

[Mr. David Hinchliffe in the Chair]

(The First Sitting of the Committee was held in private on  Tuesday 6 November 2001) Adoption and Children Bill

Adoption and Children Bill

Examination of Witnesses - Memorandum from the Department of Health - KEY CHANGES

1. The Adoption and Children Bill was previously introduced to Parliament on 15 March 2001. It was referred to a Select Committee which held three public hearings and received evidence from adoption stakeholders and members of the public. The Bill fell at the dissolution of Parliament. 
 2. This paper sets out the substantive policy changes and additions incorporated in the version of the Bill introduced on 19 October. These fall into six main areas: 
 —adoption support—a widening of the assessment provisions and the introduction of new registration provisions; 
 —the placement provisions—changes to placement orders, in particular bringing them into closer alignment with the Children Act 1989; 
 —access to information about a person's adoption—where the Bill sets out new proposals in this area; 
 —intercountry adoption—the Bill incorporates new controls developed following the Government's review of the legislative framework earlier this year; 
 —special guardianship—the introduction of new provisions covering support services for these placements; 
 —devolution—the Bill now incorporates a range of measures in respect of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
 3. Several of these changes have been made in response to evidence submitted to the Select Committee. In addition to the major policy changes highlighted, there have been a large number of drafting improvements to the Bill.

Right to an assessment for adoption support services (clause 4)

4. The White Paper Adoption: a new approach, published in December 2000, included a commitment to ``give all families adopting children, especially those who have been looked after, a new right to an assessment by their council for post-placement support''. Clause 4(1) of the previous version of the Bill underpinned this new right to an assessment for adopted children and their adoptive parents. It was intended that other people affected by adoption, such as birth parents and adopted adults, would continue to be able to approach their local authority and request adoption support services, as under the existing arrangements. 
 5. Concern was expressed by adoption stakeholders during Select Committee that the rights of everyone affected by adoption to have their needs for adoption support services considered should be made clear on the face of the Bill. In response to these concerns, clause 4(1) of the new Bill places local authorities under a duty to carry out an assessment of the needs for adoption support of all those listed in clause 3(1). The right to an assessment therefore now applies to children who may be adopted, birth parents and guardians of such children, prospective adopters, adopted children and adults, adoptive parents, birth parents and former guardians of adopted people. 
 6. It is anticipated that different types of assessments will be appropriate for different parties. The details of the various types of assessment will be set out in regulations made under clause 4(7)(b). These assessment procedures will be determined in consultation with stakeholders, as part of the work on the new framework for adoption support promised in the White Paper. Detailed proposals for this framework covering the range of services to be put in place, including financial support, as well as arrangements for assessment, are to be published for consultation in the spring.

Registration of adoption support providers (clause 8)

7. The Bill includes new provisions to allow organisations other than adoption agencies to provide adoption support services, whilst ensuring that organisations operating in this sector are properly regulated. 
 8. Clause 8 amends the Care Standards Act 2000 to require adoption support agencies to register with the registration authority (the National Care Standards Commission in England and the National Assembly in Wales) under Part 2 of that Act. An adoption support agency may be voluntary or profit-making, and both organisations and sole practitioners providing adoption support services will be required to apply for registration. These provisions will affect adoption support providers which are not currently subject to any form of inspection or regulation, such as post-adoption support centres and independent counsellors providing adoption support services. Adoption support providers which are already regulated through other means, such as local authorities, approved voluntary adoption agencies, NHS providers and the Registrar General, will be exempt from the new registration scheme in order to prevent unnecessary duplication of registration. 
 9. Registration will ensure that adoption support services are provided to an appropriately high standard by staff with the necessary training and expertise. Registered adoption support agencies will be able to provide birth records counselling under paragraph 2(1)(b) of Schedule 2 of the Bill, in line with the White Paper commitment to enable bodies other than approved voluntary adoption agencies to provide birth records counselling for adopted people. They will also be able to provide counselling in respect of information disclosed by adoption agencies under clause 60, as part of the new scheme for access to information underpinned by the Bill. 
 10. Provision of adoption support services without being appropriately registered will be an offence under section 11 of the Care Standards Act 2000, punishable by a maximum penalty of a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (£5000) and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months. 
 11. The Government made clear its intention to introduce provisions to this effect at the time of introduction of the previous version of the Bill in March.

Placement Orders (clause 20)

12. A placement order is an order made by the court authorising a local authority to place a child for adoption with any prospective adopters who may be chosen by the authority. A local authority must apply for a placement order where they are satisfied that a child should be adopted, but the parents do not consent to placement or have withdrawn their consent. 
 13. In response to points raised in consultation on the previous version of the Bill, the Government has restricted the ability to seek placement orders to local authorities only. Previously this was also open to voluntary adoption agencies. This change was made in recognition of concerns that it is inappropriate for voluntary organisations to be able to apply to the court to have a child compulsorily placed for adoption against the parent's wishes. 
 14. A further change has also been made to this clause to provide that a court may not make a placement order unless the child is already subject to a care order, or the court has the power to make a care order under section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989. In order to be able to make a care order (and therefore a placement order) the court must first be satisfied that the child is suffering, or likely to suffer, significant harm, and also that the harm or likelihood of harm is attributable to the care being given to the child or likely to be given to him if no order were made not being that reasonably expected of a parent, or the child is beyond parental control. 
 15. Linking the making of placement orders with these provisions in the Children Act 1989 is intended to deliver on the Government's undertaking to align adoption law with the Children Act. The same threshold for compulsory intervention in family life is to apply where a local authority seeks authority to place a child for adoption without parental consent as applies where an authority seeks to take a child into care under a care order. Where a court considers the `significant harm' threshold is met, it will then consider whether a placement order should be made. The provisions in clause 1 of the Bill will apply—the child's welfare will be the paramount consideration, the court will apply the welfare checklist set out in clause 1(4) and the court will have to consider its full range of powers and will only make the order if it is better for the child than not to do so. 
 16. This change has also been made in response to consultation on the previous version of the Bill. Several stakeholders in their evidence to the Select Committee expressed concern that children could be placed for adoption against the parent's wishes without this threshold being met. This was felt to be inappropriate given the widely understood and accepted principles of the Children Act.

Access to Information (clauses 53 to 62)

17. The new version of the Bill aims to provide for a more consistent approach to access to information held in adoption agency records, and to information held in birth records. The Bill provides for a single point of access to identifying information through adoption agencies, as the bodies best placed to provide the support and counselling needed for this sensitive task. This new scheme seeks to recognise the interests of all those involved and to take account of their views wherever possible. The provisions are new and the Government would welcome views on whether they strike the right balance. 
 18. Further information about the new scheme for access to information is provided at Annex A.

Intercountry Adoption (clauses 80 and 83)

19. The Bill includes new tighter controls on intercountry adoption. The need for improved safeguards was highlighted by the high profile Internet twins case earlier this year. The Government made clear its commitment to further consider the controls needed for intercountry adoption at the time of introduction of the previous version of the Bill. 
 20. Chapter 6 of the Bill incorporates many of the measures in the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999 and extends those measures with new safeguards and penalties. The 1999 Act will largely be repealed in respect of England and Wales when the Bill is enacted. 
 21. Clause 80 restates the restriction in section 14 of the 1999 Act in respect of British residents bringing or causing someone else to bring a child habitually resident outside the British Islands into the UK with the intention of adopting the child in the UK, unless the person complies with prescribed requirements and meets prescribed conditions. It also introduces a new offence where a child is brought into the UK after being adopted overseas by a British resident within the previous six months, where the British resident has not complied with prescribed requirements and met prescribed conditions. This is in addition to the provision included in the March version of the Bill. It is intended that in both cases regulations will require the British resident to be assessed and approved as suitable to adopt by a UK adoption agency prior to bringing the child into the UK. 
 22. The new Bill puts in place tougher penalties for those seeking to circumvent the safeguards in clause 80. A person not following the proper procedure will be liable on summary conviction to up to six months' imprisonment and/or a fine not exceeding £5,000 or, in the event of the case being referred to the Crown Court, up to twelve months' imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. 
 23. Clause 83 has been amended to allow the Government to ensure that in the future adoption orders made overseas will only be recognised in the UK when the systems in that country meet criteria set out in regulations. A new designated list will be established based on clear criteria. The criteria will include ensuring that proper consents have been given by the birth parents, that the prospective adopters have been assessed and approved as suitable to adopt, and that no profit has been made from the process.

Clause 110 -Support for Special Guardianship Placements

24. New section 14F of clause 110 makes provision for local authority support services for special guardians and children subject to special guardianship orders. The White Paper Adoption: a new approach made clear that special guardians should have access to the full range of support services, including, where appropriate, financial support, to help the placement succeed. The Government made clear its intention to introduce provisions to this effect when the previous version of the Bill was introduced in March. New section 14F fulfils this commitment. 
 25. Section 14F places local authorities under a duty to make arrangements to provide support services for special guardianship placements. The support services will include counselling, advice and information, and other services as prescribed in regulations. It is intended that the services prescribed in regulations will include financial support. 
 26. Regulations will also be made prescribing the circumstances in which local authorities must, at the request of special guardians and children subject to special guardianship orders, carry out an assessment of that person's needs for special guardianship support services. The Government has indicated its intention to consult widely with stakeholders in developing the regulations on support services for special guardianship placements. 
 27. The provisions on special guardianship support in section 14F are very similar to the provisions in clauses 3 and 4 dealing with adoption support. As with adoption support services, the local authority may carry out an assessment of need at the same time as an assessment of that person's needs for any other purpose. The intention is to facilitate the joined up planning and provision of public services support.

Devolution (clauses 113, 115 to 119 and 120)

28. The new Bill includes changes in respect of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
 29. In respect of Wales, the Adoption Register provisions (clauses 115 to 119) now provide for the register to be established and run jointly by the Secretary of State and the National Assembly for Wales. 
 30. The Scottish Parliament has confirmed that it is content for the Bill to cover Scotland in respect of the enhanced intercountry adoption controls. Clause 120 therefore provides in Scots law for new restrictions along the lines of those in clause 80. It is intended to bring forward a complementary Scottish provision on the designated list during the passage of the Bill. It is also intended to add provisions to cover the cross border effects of the placement provisions. 
 31. The restrictions on advertising in clause 113 apply to both Scotland and Northern Ireland. It is also intended to extend the reform of the designated list to Northern Ireland

ANNEX A - Access to information about a person's adoption - Introduction

1. The Bill includes new provisions governing the disclosure to adopted people of background information held by the adoption agency in connection with their adoption, the disclosure of identifying information and for access to their birth records. The provisions also cover the disclosure by the adoption agency of information to birth relatives and others. Many of these provisions are new, and the Government would welcome views on whether it has achieved the right balance. 
 2. This annex briefly describes the: 
 —current position 
 —provisions as set out in the Bill as introduced in March 
 —changes made in the new Bill

Current position

3. Regulations1 provide that adoption agencies may disclose information in its possession, as it thinks fit for the purposes of carrying out its functions as an adoption agency. This enables for example adoption agencies to disclose information to: 
 —an adopted person about his background, although the guidance advises that this would not include the information recorded on the birth certificate as disclosure of this is provided for separately in the Adoption Act 1976; 
 —and to birth parents, information about the adopted child's progress. The guidance indicates that the child's new identity and whereabouts should not be disclosed. 
 4. The regulations thus give a wide discretion to adoption agencies and there are variations in practice. In many cases this works well. In some cases agencies have passed on sensitive identifying information without consulting the person who would be identified. 
 5. Section 51 in the Adoption Act 1976 provides that an adopted person aged 18 or over could obtain on request the information necessary for him to obtain a certified copy of his birth certificate from the Registrar General, which identifies the birth parents. In 1975, Parliament, in recognition that there was less stigma associated with adoption and of the need for more openness, decided to remove the guarantee of complete confidentiality given to birth parents who had previously placed their children for adoption. Until then, adopted persons were not statutorily able to find out information about their parents. 
 6. Section 51 has worked well in the vast majority of cases. However, since the 1976 Act there have been concerns about a small number of cases where there could be a risk to birth parents if they were traced through the birth records. In 1991, a court case2 was brought against the Registrar General's refusal to disclose the necessary information for a certified copy of a birth certificate to be obtained by a man with a personality disorder who had been adopted and was thought to be a danger to the woman who would be revealed as his natural mother. 
 7. The case went on to the Court of Appeal which decided that although the Registrar General has a duty to provide the information necessary for a person to obtain a birth certificate, he should not comply if to do so would: 
 —enable a person to benefit from a serious crime committed by him or to benefit from a serious crime he intended to commit 
 —or if circumstances were such that there was a current and justified apprehension of a significant risk that he might in the future use the information to commit a serious crime. 
 8. However, the Registrar General often does not have sufficient information about the adopted person or his birth family and so is not well placed in trying to reach a decision to withhold birth records where there is the possibility of a serious crime being committed. Nor are birth relatives able to take legal action to prevent the Registrar General from releasing identifying information unless they become aware that the adopted person is trying to trace them. Some birth relatives have experienced distress at having their identifying details passed on to the adopted person and they have complained that they were not asked for their consent. 
 9. Regulations3 currently provide that as soon as practicable after an adoption order is made, the adoption agency must provide the adopters with such information about the child as the agency considers is appropriate. The type and form of the information disclosed under this provision is not specified. 
 10. Guidance advises that agencies should be able to pass on to the adoptive parent much of the material held on the child's case record, while seeking to respect the confidential basis on which information may have been supplied. The adopters must be advised when they receive this information that it should be passed to the child when the adopters consider it is the right time to do so but in any event not later than the child's eighteenth birthday.

The Adoption and Children Bill, March 2001

11. The Adoption White Paper included a commitment to provide adopted people with consistency of access to information about their family history and their adoption. When the Adoption and Children Bill was published in March it included a new right for adopted people to have access to a standard package of background information from their adoption agency records when they reach the age of 18 about their former lives. In most cases, it is envisaged that adopted people will be able to obtain the information they need about their birth family. However, there might be circumstances where information identifies an individual against their wishes. The Bill was therefore drafted to provide for identifying information to be given if the individual's consent was forthcoming. 
 12. Where the information would identify an individual, for example birth parents, clause 49 of the Bill provided that such information could not be released by an adoption agency or the court without the consent of the individual concerned. In their evidence to the Select Committee several organisations expressed concern that there was no provision for the adoption agency to have discretion to override these objections. 
 13. However, clauses 63 and 64 mirrored section 51 in the Adoption Act 1976 in giving adopted people automatic access to their birth record, as described in paragraph 5.

New provisions on the disclosure of information

14. The Government has put forward proposals in the new version of the Bill that seek to create a new system for access to information. It would provide a single point of access to identifying information4 through adoption agencies and would apply to adoptions made after the Bill is implemented. As many of these provisions are new the Government would like to hear views on whether they strike the right balance. 
 15. The provisions are based on the following objectives: 
 —to ensure consistency of access to information for adopted people about the background to their adoption, a commitment made in the White Paper 
 —to give every individual involved in a person's adoption a right to express their wishes about the sensitive information that identifies them 
 —to give adoption agencies the discretion in exceptional circumstances to determine whether to override a decision to withhold or disclose identifying information 
 —and to balance the agency's exercise of discretion by providing a right for an independent review of the adoption agency's determination. 
 16. The intention is for the system to work generally as follows: 
 a) to deliver on the White Paper commitment, there should be standard package of information about a person's adoption and his background5 which is held by the adoption agency which: 
 i) provides information about others, such as birth parents and siblings, but does not identify them6 
 ii) is disclosed7 to the adopters as soon as possible after the adoption order 
 iii) is available8 as a right to the adopted person when he reaches the age of 18 
 b) that the adopted adult will be able to ask for identifying information about anyone involved in their adoption and to have it disclosed9 to them by the adoption agency provided:10 
 i) the birth parents11 have not objected to the disclosure of information that would identify them. This would include whether they have a specific objection to the disclosure of the information on the birth certificate. It is envisaged that in majority of cases the birth parents will be willing for the birth certificate to be made available through the adopted person's adoption agency12. The adopted person will have information about their date and place of birth, whether there is an objection or not. 
 ii) or consent has been granted by anyone else who would be identified 
 c) that the birth parents and others will be able to ask for identifying information about anyone involved in the adoption and to have it disclosed13 to them by the adoption agency provided14 consent has been granted by the person who would be identified. 
 d) in exceptional circumstances, the adoption agency would be required15 through regulations and under guidance to exercise a discretion in determining whether to disclose or to withhold identifying information. Examples include where one of the birth parents objects to the release of identifying information but the other does not. Another might be where an adopted person has asked for identifying information, the birth relative has objected but the interests of the adopted person's health and welfare are such that he should have the identifying information. 
 e) where the adoption agency reaches a determination to disclose or withhold identifying information contrary to the expressed view of the relevant party, it is to be subject to a review by an independent panel which would be constituted under the power provided by clause 12 in the Bill. For example, an adopted person would have a right to ask for a review of a determination by the adoption agency to withhold the information. 
 17. Many adoptions are now made on an open basis. Open adoptions are adoptions where it is seen to be beneficial for the child for the exchange of information and or contact to take place between the birth and adoptive families. Often the child knows from an early stage that he or she has been adopted; the adoptive parents and the adopted person have identifying information about the birth parents; and the birth parents have identifying information about the adoptive family and the adopted child. 
 18. The measures in the Bill that provide for the safeguarding of identifying information are intended to provide for the minority of adoptions where the sharing of such information is not seen to be appropriate in the circumstances and to ensure that where sensitive information is shared the views and interests of all parties are considered. To ensure that arrangements for open adoptions are clear and that they are not hindered where there is agreement clause 54(6) provides for the disclosure of protected information and section 76 information where an agreement is reached that includes the adoption agency. The intention is to provide for means to underpin an agreement between the adoption agency, the adoptive parents and the birth parents for the sharing of identifying information where the agency considers that an open adoption agreement would benefit the child's welfare and best interests. 
 Notes: 
 1 Adoption Agencies Regulations 1983, regulation 15 
 2 R. V. Registrar General, ex p. Smith, [1991] 2 All E. R. 88 
 3 Adoption Agencies Regulations 1983, regulations 12 & 13A 
 4 Clause 54(3). Identifying information is defined as information where a person is named or otherwise identified, and information from which someone can be identified from that information if it is put together with other information that the agency releases. 
 5 Clause 55(4). Background information will include information such as the child's birth details, medical history, interests, any special needs and progress. Such information will assist the adopters in the care and upbringing of the child. 
 6 Clause 57(1)(b). 
 7 Clause 57. 
 8 Clause 58 (2). 
 9 Clause 58(5) 
 10 Clause 58(6) 
 11 Clause 61(3). Birth parents will be informed at the time of the adoption order of their right to object until such time as the adopted person applies for their identifying information. 
 12 The Registrar General will retain his duty to maintain the birth records of the adopted person. He will also retain his duty to maintain the Adopted Children Register and the Adoption Contact Register. Under clauses 58(5), 59(2) and 76(3) access to the birth records of the adopted person will be provided through the adoption agency, as the agency is best placed to undertake this sensitive task. 
 13 Clause 59(2). 
 14 Clause 59(3). 
 15 Clause 61(1)(a) 
 Mark Ferrero, Branch Head, Adoption and Permanance, Cathy Morgan, Section Head, Adoption and Permanence, James Paton, Bill Principal, Adoption and Children Bill, Directorate of Children, Older People and Social Care Services, and Sandra Walker, Assistant Director, Solicitor's Office Division C, Health and Personal Social Services, Department of Health; Amanda Finlay, Director of Public and Private Rights, Lord Chancellor's Department; and Kieron Mahoney, Office for National Statistics, called in and examined.

David Hinchliffe: I welcome you, colleagues, to this first evidence session for the Adoption and Children Bill, and in particular I welcome our witnesses.
 As you will appreciate, the time available is very constrained. We have an hour and a half in which—hopefully—to get through our business, with a further hour and a half for dealing with other witnesses. I will therefore be grateful if witnesses keep their answers crisp and brief, and I hope that my colleagues will ask their questions in a similar fashion.

Meg Munn: I start with the issue of placement orders, parental consent and consistency with the Children Act 1989. The adoption law review has suggested that wording should be included in the Bill stating that parental consent to adoption should not be dispensed with unless the benefits to the child of being adopted are so significantly better as to justify dispensing with parental consent. If such a provision were included in the Bill, what issues would arise and what would be the likely effect?

James Paton (Directorate of Children, Older People and Social Care Services, Department of Health): We looked at that issue, following the adoption law review, in developing the Bill and the draft Bill in 1996. I think that the Government believe that the child's welfare should be the paramount consideration in all adoption decisions, including the question of dispensing with parental consent. Clause 1 sets out a checklist of factors that the court must look at in considering whether to make a placement order or an adoption order without the consent of the parents. In particular, I draw the Committee's attention to clause 1(4)(f), which obliges the court to consider the child's relationship with their birth family and any other significant people, the views of the family and their capacity to care for the child and provide a stable and secure home.
 We did not explicitly use the phrase ``so significantly better'' because we did not think that it added anything to the considerations that the court must bear in mind in taking such decisions. The court will have to consider all the various factors. In weighing up whether or not to make the adoption order, it will have to bear in mind those factors, its other powers under adoption legislation and the Children Act, and, of course, the various parties' rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European convention on human rights. The decision will need to be taken in the context of ECHR case law and the test that the court would have to take in deciding to dispense with the parents' consent would not be trivial or low. 
 We did not think that saying that the court must not dispense with the consent unless it is ``so significantly better'' added anything—what would the court look at in deciding whether it was ``so significantly better''? We think that the court would consider the list of factors in clause 1(4), weigh up various factors in the context of convention rights and the court's other powers and come to a decision. We are not sure that adding ``so significantly better'' would make a substantive difference, and we are concerned that it may also create confusion by opening up a large vein of debate about what ``significantly better'' meant.

Julian Brazier: To ask an overall point, I would like to address the provisions relating to dispensing with parental consent. There have been many cases, including that of a nice young lady from care who told me that she would have liked to be adopted but because her mum refused—a mum whom she did not subsequently see for 10 years—she could not be adopted. Are you satisfied that the Bill will remove the ability of birth parents who are basically out of the equation to delay the process endlessly?

James Paton: What it does is ensure that the court considers all relevant factors and weighs them up. The court will need to include the birth family's views, but consider them in the context of the relationship with the child, the value to the child of that relationship continuing and the relatives' capacity to provide the child with a secure and stable environment. Alongside that, there are other factors in the checklist including the benefit to the child of being adopted. Clause 1 provides a checklist of the various factors that need to be part of the decision of the court, which will weigh everything up bearing in mind the rights of all parties and convention case law, and will arrive at an appropriate decision based on the child's welfare. Would you like to add anything to that, Sandra?

Sandra Walker (Assistant Director, Solicitor's Office Division C, Health and Personal Social Services, Department of Health): The only point that I would add is that the decision about dispensing with consent is taken at the beginning of the adoption process, and is not something that is left until the end when positions have become entrenched. Such decisions are made at the start so local authorities and other agencies will not be able to place a child for adoption unless they have parental consent or a placement order.

Hilton Dawson: I have two points, Mr. Paton. The first is in response to your point about whether courts would be able to decide what ``significantly better'' meant, and what factors would be used. Surely courts are familiar with such debates because they have to consider similar matters when weighing up whether to make a care order. They must decide whether all the right conditions exist for a care order, whether it is in the child's interest and whether it will make a significant material difference. What is the difference here?

James Paton: I think that the difference is that with the care order example one is talking about a court making a judgment on whether the child is likely to suffer significant harm, which is a tangible concept, but ``significantly better'' asks the court to make a relative judgment. I am not sure that including such a requirement adds anything to what the court will be obliged to do anyway under clause 1(4). How will a court decide that it is ``so significantly better'' as to justify? It would need to consider benefits to the child, views of the parents and everything that is in the checklist, weigh them all up in the context of the various parties' rights and reach a decision. I am not sure that ``so significantly better'' adds anything and I do not think that the parallel with a care order is exact because in that case one is talking about harm, whereas this is a comparative situation—``significantly better'' or not, what does that mean?

Hilton Dawson: That is not the case. One might be dealing with significant harm, but the decision that must be made—explicitly—is whether making a care order would be better than making no order at all.

James Paton: Indeed, and the same thing must be done here.

Sandra Walker: The test for making a care order is that the threshold conditions are satisfied, which is the significant harm test. A placement order cannot be made unless the court, similarly, is satisfied that those criteria are met. Before the court can make a care order, it must look at the question of the child's welfare and then decide whether to make the order. It may not make it unless it considers that doing so would be better for the child than making no order at all. Precisely the same test is in the Bill: the court may not make an order unless it considers that doing so is better for the child.

Meg Munn: To ask a very brief question, in what percentage of cases are orders likely to be made without parental consent, and how does that compare to the current situation on adoption orders?

James Paton: That is difficult. I suppose that the closest parallel would be the current situation involving freeing orders. About 40 per cent. of looked-after children who are adopted have previously been freed. We do not have regular information about the numbers of cases that are contested but, speaking from memory, I think that research in the early '90s indicated that about 75 per cent. of freeing orders were made without the active consent of the individuals involved, although only about 20 per cent. of the actual court cases were actively contested.
 I suppose that similar proportions will arise here, although, as Sandra Walker says, because consent or dispensing with it is being dealt with earlier in the process, through the placement provisions, there may be an increase in the number of cases contested at that point. A criticism of the current adoption process is that it leaves too much to the final hearing and that birth families can feel faced with a fait accompli then. Because we are giving them a more substantive chance to address such issues earlier in the process, there may be a higher number of opposed cases. However, the court will take that into account and make a substantive decision after having heard all the parties' views.

Hilton Dawson: There is no provision in the Bill for children—we are examining the adoption of older children here—to give explicit consent to being adopted, nor does there seem to be any mention of the separate representation of children throughout adoption proceedings.

James Paton: I will make two points on that. The 1996 draft Bill included a clause that children over the age of 12 should consent to adoption. The consultation responses on that were overwhelmingly negative, indicating that it would place too great a burden on children. It was removed from the Bill on that basis. Clause 1(4)(a), however, will oblige the court to have regard to the child's ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding decisions, including the decision on making the adoption order. They will be
``considered in the light of the child's age and understanding''.
 On the child's representation, the Bill provides for officers of the Children and Family Court Advisory Service, the children's guardian in such cases, to be appointed for placement order and adoption order proceedings. The child's guardian will therefore be present to represent its views to the court and to ensure that the court process is explained to it appropriately and sensitively. In terms of the child being a party to proceedings—

Amanda Finlay (Director of Public and Private Rights, Lord Chancellor's Department): The child being a party to proceedings will happen automatically in placement order cases, and children will be able to apply to courts for leave to be made party to adoption proceedings. That will be given effect by rules once the Bill comes into effect.

James Paton: That was made clear in the explanatory notes. The rules will be made under clause 126.

Tim Loughton: May we turn to adoption support services? There has been a widespread welcome for support services being made available and extended to a wider constituency. There is a duty on local authorities to carry out assessments. Can the Department of Health officials explain how those assessments will work? They could be seen as delaying and hindering support services coming in and taking effect when they are needed. What are the mechanics of the process?

James Paton: That is absolutely not the intention. They were developed to deliver the White Paper commitment to give new adoptive families a right to request an assessment of their needs for adoption support. That was a response to the performance and innovation unit report inquiry and the subsequent consultation, which showed that on too many occasions adoptive families feel like they have to fight the system, as it were, to get a proper assessment of their support needs, and that too often public services are not co-ordinated in providing such support. The assessment process is intended to address both those concerns. The assessment is available at the request of the adoptive family. It is intended that it will facilitate a joined-up look at what services should be put in place to help the placement to succeed.
 The details of how the assessment process will work will be set out in the new national framework for adoption support, which the White Paper stated that the Government would develop in consultation with stakeholders. That work has already begun and the plan is to issue the draft framework for consultation next spring. The White Paper sets out the objectives and the Bill sets out the legislative framework under which they can be delivered, but the details of how the process will work is something that we want to develop with stakeholders, including adoptive families and social services representatives, to ensure that the system works in the way that we want and does not lead to any of the problems that you have identified.

Tim Loughton: The trouble is, of course, that we are looking at the Bill now: it will have passed through Parliament by the time the regulations are published, let alone by the time the results of the consultation emerge.
 What will happen if a local authority refuses to provide an assessment? We all recognise that there is an acute shortage of social workers, particularly in the child care field; if they are all focused on providing assessments, who will be left to provide services? How is the process to be resourced?

James Paton: Dealing with the first point about the assessment process, the Bill provides that adoptive families have a right to request and receive an assessment for support services.
 In terms of resourcing, the Government have already provided £66 million over four years to support the White Paper programme, and of course the resources required to implement the Bill will be addressed in the forthcoming spending review process. 
 On the shortage of social workers, the Government recognise that there are problems. That is why they recently launched a recruitment campaign to attract more people into the profession.

Tim Loughton: Will that money be ring-fenced? What happens when social services departments do not provide an assessment, or their subsequent support services are not up to scratch? What onus is there on them to provide, and what is the penalty if they do not?

James Paton: With regard to social services departments failing to perform their duties under the Act, the Bill contains default clauses, one of which is clause 15—

Sandra Walker: It is clause 14.

James Paton: They allow the Secretary of State to issue directions to authorities to help them comply with their duties under the Bill. The social services inspectorate currently inspects social services adoption functions. In future the National Care Standards Commission will inspect such functions. Any failure to deliver services will be drawn to the Secretary of State's attention. He has a range of powers under the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 and the Local Government Act 1999.

Tim Loughton: Although I can see that we have the framework to say, ``You are not doing properly what you are supposed to be doing'', how will failure be judged? Will there be a time limit by which an assessment must be made, and a further time limit by which the support services that that assessment deems are necessary come into effect? Will such time limits be included in the regulations that are to be issued in spring?

James Paton: These are all issues on which we shall consult in terms of how the process should work in detail and what the standards should be. However, the National Care Standards Commission will need a set of standards against which to inspect. Those standards will include the provision of adoption support services. Standards will be applicable, but their detail and how the process should work in terms of precise time scales is something that we shall develop with a range of stakeholders. After that process, we shall set out guidance and regulations to be inspected against and enforced as I have described.

Tim Loughton: On intermediary services, do you agree that they have a valuable role to play, and has consideration been given to making them a statutory obligation?

James Paton: There are circumstances in which intermediary services can play a useful role. When two parties in the adoption process want to make contact, it is often better for that to be handled through an adoption agency that has the appropriate expertise. In terms of whether consideration has been given to putting this on a statutory basis, this is one of several potential adoption support services on which we shall be consulting as part of the development of the framework. The intention is that the powers will allow us to prescribe that local authorities must put in place a range of adoption support services. Local authorities will be obliged to put in place arrangements to provide the range of services that we develop through the framework. It is obviously open for that to include intermediary services, which will be consulted on alongside other potential adoption support services that form part of the framework.

David Hinchliffe: Mr. Brazier, you have a question on the registration of adoption support providers.

Julian Brazier: There is concern that the provision could kill off small self-help groups. Looking at the exemptions in the relevant clause, the one that seems to be missing is groups that are run wholly or mainly by adopters. Are the Government planning to force little groups of adoptive parents, who get together in the same way as other groups of parents get together, to register?

Cathy Morgan (Section Head, Adoption and Permanence, Department of Health): The intention is to try and regulate a sensitive position in terms of vulnerable people who are affected by adoption. The regulatory burden will need to be proportionate to the level of protection that can be offered. We do not intend to prevent individuals from meeting in their homes in a supportive environment. However, if services such as counselling were to be provided, they would fall within the boundaries of the registration. We shall be consulting on those standards so that we can ensure that we are not over-regulating the system. The intention is not to close down small groups of people getting together.

Julian Brazier: We have a problem throughout the Bill because, for reasons that one can well understand, we are establishing in clause after clause a framework for regulations. The real business will be contained in statutory instruments, which may go through on the nod or be considered very briefly in Standing Committee. It is crucial that clause 8, which includes six groups of exemptions, should have a seventh—a paragraph (g) should be added to cover groups that wholly or mainly meet in people's own homes and are wholly or mainly organised by adopters themselves.

James Paton: That is something that we shall look at. The intention is certainly not to police the activities of individuals in their homes; it is to regulate the provision of counselling in a sensitive setting for potentially vulnerable people so that it is of appropriate quality and conducted by people who are appropriately qualified or equipped to perform that function. That is the intention and we shall look at the point.

Julian Brazier: That would be good. It would be nice if the issue could be covered in the Bill, rather than considered in a Standing Committee at a later stage by a group of people with a rubber stamp.

Jacqui Smith: I hope that that is not a suggestion that parliamentarians would merely rubber-stamp something. Mr. Brazier: Minister, I stand reproached.

David Hinchliffe: To turn to clauses 53 to 62 covering access to information, I am interested in what appears to be a change of tack on the rights of adopted people to gain access to their birth certificates. We have received, as you are probably aware, significant evidence expressing concern about that issue. I recognise that there has always been a problem with balancing the rights of an adoptive child with those of the birth parents. During the last Session, when we looked at the child migrant issue--you are probably familiar with it, Mr. Paton--we met people who were denied any knowledge of their birth and natural parents, and I am concerned that we seem to be going over the same ground now. The National Organisation for Counselling Adoptees and Parents, for example, said that it was appalled at the changes made to the Bill; I wonder what your response is to such concerns. Why are the changes being introduced now?

James Paton: The first thing to do is to say is that we recognise that this is an extremely difficult and sensitive area in which it is difficult to balance the rights of the various parties in the process.
 We are making the change because we are taking the opportunity--it does not arise often—to look at the adoption legislation and to consider whether there is anything in the existing system that we might want to change. The Government are taking a consultative approach to the issue, which is why the Bill has been referred to a Special Standing Committee, and we are keen to hear the views of all the various organisations in the field on these proposals. We recognise that they are a change, but this is an extremely difficult and sensitive area in which it is hard to strike a balance. 
 Perhaps it would be helpful if I explained the thinking behind the change and what drove it.

David Hinchliffe: If you could do so briefly, please.

James Paton: We are trying to do three things. First, we are trying to provide a more consistent approach to the information that adopted people receive about their background, which is why the Bill includes provisions to prescribe a standard package of information that agencies will need to hold because adoptive people will have a right to see it when they reach the age of 18.
 Secondly, when information identifies individuals, we want to provide for all parties to be able to express a view about the provision of that information to another party. The Bill provides, for example, that birth relatives would be asked whether they would have any objection in future to an adopted person receiving identifying information about them from the adoption agency record, including a birth certificate. The current system does not provide for birth relatives to be able to express a view on that and for it to be taken into account. The adoption law review suggested that there should be a change concerning adoption agency records in the context of data protection philosophy and human rights. People should be given an opportunity to express a view on whether identifying information about them should be passed to another party. 
 The third point is about trying to provide safeguards in the system for a small minority of cases in which it would be inappropriate and perhaps harmful for information to be exchanged. We recognise and expect that in the vast majority of cases there will be openness and exchange of information. The provisions have been designed to deliver that, which is why the presumption is that, unless there is an objection by the family to the exchange of identifying information, that information will normally be provided to the adopted person.

David Hinchliffe: Is the change based on evidence of problems arising from birth families being upset by being contacted? Have you had representations about that?

James Paton: We have, but it is fair to say that we are talking about a very small minority of cases—although they are potentially very significant for the individuals involved. I acknowledge that in the vast majority of cases the system works well. The concern is about the small minority of cases in which it does not. People have been contacted as a result of identifying information being provided against their wishes and we have received a small number of representations on the effects of that. In addition, there could be instances in which it might be dangerous for relatives if identifying information about them was provided to an adopted person who might wish to cause them harm.

David Hinchliffe: Do you not think that you are taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut?

James Paton: This is one of the issues on which we want to hear views and we shall be interested to hear the Committee's views. We acknowledge that in the vast majority of cases the system has worked well. However, the implications for the individuals involved in a small minority of cases in which it does not could be significant.

Jonathan Djanogly: I should like briefly to look at the matter in an historical context. The regime that people are talking about was introduced in 1975-76, but adoption started in the 1920s. My concern is constancy, and you said, Mr. Paton, that that is an important part of what you are attempting to achieve in the Bill. When we moved to the current regime, what changed from the pre-1976 regime?

James Paton: Kieron, am I right that before 1976 a court order was required to obtain access to birth relatives?

Kieron Mahoney (Office for National Statistics): Yes, and such court orders were relatively rare. It was in response to the demand for access to information that the new arrangements were put in place in the Children Act 1975.It is interesting to note that the Government of the day decided that as a safeguard the new arrangements would be available only to those who had had counselling services if they were adopted before that date to guarantee the promise made to birth parents who had given up children for adoption prior to that date that there would never be any attempt at contact. For those adopted after 1975, counselling was an option so that people could choose whether to be given the information in a more supportive environment.

Jonathan Djanogly: The point is that after 1975, one adopted a child on the basis that at some point the child would find out—whereas before they would not have found out.

James Paton: Yes.

Kieron Mahoney: Yes.

Jonathan Djanogly: Before 1975, the deal was that the adoptee would not know, and after 1975 that they would know.

James Paton: And that it would technically be open for that person to get a copy of their birth certificate.

Jonathan Djanogly: I just make the point because it is relevant in terms of pre-1975 adoptions. We should not assume that people under the old regime should be treated the same as those post-1975, because the situation under which they adopted was very different.

Liz Blackman: The restrictions have been introduced to safeguard a small number of birth parents who may be put in danger.

James Paton: That is one view.

Liz Blackman: So, what is your take on NORCAP's suggestion that there should be no restrictions, but that in cases of concern the adoptee should absolutely undertake not to make contact with their birth parents? Are you happy with that suggestion?

James Paton: That is something that it would be interesting to explore. My concern would be about what happens in the small number of cases when the adopted person is potentially intent on causing harm to the birth relative. The new system that we are suggesting channels access to identifying information—both the birth record and the agency record—through adoption agencies, which we thought would be best placed to make these sensitive and difficult decisions. An adopted person would approach such an agency and request access to the information, and we would hope that that would give an experienced agency a chance to pick up instances of concern. I have had such cases mentioned to me by adoption agencies. One concerned an adopted person who contacted an adoption agency seeking information about their birth family because they wanted to kill their birth parent because the adoption had taken place after severe childhood abuse that had left the adopted person disfigured, and they were intent on tracking their birth parent down. I suppose a concern might be how a voluntary system would safeguard birth parents in that small number of cases.

Liz Blackman: I agree; I thought that it was an interesting suggestion, but I was unsure whether it would safeguard birth parents in the situation that you outlined.

Mark Ferrero (Adoption and Permanence, Department of Health): I would like to pick up on the contextual points. It is important to understand that the law we are making now reflects the circumstances of adoptions today, most of which are open and occur with contact. That is beneficial for the child, and it is also beneficial for the birth parent because it can help them come to terms with their grieving over the loss of their child. However, in a tiny minority of cases, the circumstances are very difficult. We are trying to strike the right balance. We are not trying to step in the way of good adoption practice, but we are trying to provide a legal framework that protects against the most serious cases. We would be interested to hear what the ADSS—the Association of Directors of Social Services—has to say about this proposal because I understand from my contacts that it supports this approach.

Jonathan Djanogly: The proposals are, of course, looking forward; this is not retrospective. Adoption based on a certain framework in the past holds good. We are looking to what we want to do in future, which is an important point.

Mark Ferrero: That is a very important point.

Kevin Brennan: It is an important point, although it is also important to reflect on the fact that there have been massive social changes since the deal was done. Many birth parents feel no sense of shame in relation to adoption, and take a different view in later life about contact than that they might have held at the time of the adoption. The point about adopted adults contacting birth parents has been well pressed. Does the Bill do anything to enhance the rights of birth parents to contact adopted children in adulthood, and what principles have you applied in considering that issue?

James Paton: We have applied principles that are generally consistent with the process at the moment: when an adult requests identifying information from the adoption agency concerning the adopted person, that should not be disclosed unless the adopted person is consulted. Of course, the adoption contact register is also in operation so that birth relatives who wish to make contact with an adopted person can register on it. If the adopted person also registers, they are informed of the relatives' registration and can take forward contact.

Kevin Brennan: May I press that point a little further? The information exchange requires the registration of both parties, but there are cases—those that have just been mentioned might be examples—in which an adopted child might have an incorrect belief about its birth parents and the reasons why it was adopted. For example, an adopted child might believe improperly that it was abused by its birth parents, rather than by somebody in the care system. I know of such a case. Under those circumstances, is there any provision for the birth parent to signal actively through a third party their desire to make contact, rather than having to rely on the adopted child seeking information in adulthood by registering?

James Paton: The question of a more active service is part of the issue of the role of intermediary services in providing adoption support. As I said, we will be consulting on that as part of the national framework.

Hilton Dawson: What criminal offences in the past 25 years have been committed by adopted people against their birth parents?

James Paton: I do not have that information.

Hilton Dawson: Should not that information be absolutely seminal to a decision, given that a step is being taken that could cut across what many would regard as a fundamental human right: to have knowledge of one's origins?

James Paton: There is no absolute right to access to the information on the register at the moment. Of course, when the birth parent registers no objection, things will continue, and that is what we expect to happen in the vast majority of cases.

Hilton Dawson: These issues are full of emotional pain and difficulties, worries and anxieties, but what real evidence is there that the legislation since 1975 has been harmful to anyone?

James Paton: As we said at the beginning, we are talking about a small minority of cases of concern. Representations have been made to us by individuals who have been contacted against their wishes as a result of the supply of identifying information. They consider that to be extremely distressing. There are also risks inherent in the small number of cases in which the adopted person may wish to cause the birth parent harm. We have had such cases anecdotally brought to out attention, and there was also the Smith case, but it is fair to say that we are talking about a small number of cases.

Hilton Dawson: Did the adopted person actually harm the birth parent in those cases? Were the police involved, or did the matter just not come to anything? Is there any case in which someone has actually committed a criminal offence against their birth parent?

James Paton: I do not have that information. In one of the cases that was mentioned to me, the adopted person was seeking information with the express intention of killing his birth parent. He sought that information through his adoption agency, so they were able to counsel him, to inform the police and to contact the birth relative. As things stand at the moment, he could have sought his birth certificate through the registrar-general and taken action to track down the person without involving the adoption agency, so the system might never have been made aware of what was happening. There were potential risks involved in that situation. However, we are talking about a small number of cases.

Julian Brazier: I echo the comments of the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson) and, indeed, yours, Mr. Chairman. It seems an extraordinary use of a sledgehammer to crack a nut, messing up an arrangement that has worked very well for 25-odd years in order to protect one or two alleged abusers who are in danger.
 I return to what the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Kevin Brennan) said. The Bill is absolutely right to hold the line on information to birth parents. We can all exchange stories about that. I am glad to see the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre nodding. Through my constituency postbag I heard about a couple who adopted an unconnected boy and girl of a young age who had both had a terrible time prior to being taken into care. The boy turned out very successfully and has a good university degree; the girl was all set until age 15, when the birth mother managed to discover where she was living. From then on, she went rapidly downhill and is now a prostitute in London. Countries such as Australia, which have allowed birth parents access to information in most adoption cases, have seen a collapse in adoption, because potential adoptive parents know that it does not work. I am sorry: that was a point rather than a question.

David Hinchliffe: It was a very interesting point.

Kevin Brennan: I was talking about contact in adulthood, not during the process.

Jonathan Djanogly: The damage that could be caused to a recipient of information is not just physical damage, which is all that has been mentioned so far. It could be the result of moral pressures, someone wanting financial support, or, in relation to a pre-1975 adoption, the child not even knowing that it was adopted—pre-1975, people often changed first names. There are many issues other than whether someone is going to be physically attacked, including emotional and financial matters.

David Hinchliffe: I am conscious that we are in debate rather than asking questions, but do you want to respond briefly to that, Mr. Paton, before we move on?

James Paton: I do not think that I have any specific point to make. Generally, I agree that it is a question not only of safeguarding from physical harm, but allowing birth relatives to have some kind of say about whether or not they want identifying information about them to be disclosed.

Andrew Love: Before we move on, I want to ask Mr. Paton a question about the independent review mechanism. A great deal is being left to regulations in terms of procedures and which decisions will be taken, yet the mechanism is supposed to create confidence in the system. Can you outline the independent review mechanism and how it will operate?

James Paton: There are two things that the independent review mechanism will do. First, it will deliver the White Paper commitment that there should be an independent review available for prospective adopters where the agency indicates that it is minded to turn them down and they are dissatisfied with the reasons that they have been given. At the moment, they can make representations to the agency panel that assessed them and request a further consideration. The view taken in the PIU report and subsequently confirmed in the consultation was that that was not seen as sufficiently independent to build the credibility of the assessment process and that there should be an independent review mechanism that prospective adopters can turn to where they consider that they are going to be turned down for unsatisfactory reasons. The review mechanism would be able to consider the case afresh and make new recommendations to the agency.
 That is the first purpose of the review mechanism, but the Government did say that they would consult on the detail of how it would work and set that out in regulations. It is clearly important that it works in a way that supports the process, that it is not overwhelmed, and that it does not lead to delay and set up perverse incentives. That is why the provisions in the Bill are flexible—they enable us to take into account the effects of any consultation. 
 We also envisage a potential role for an independent review mechanism under the new access to information provisions, and our memorandum to the Committee sets out what we envisage providing. There may be some cases where, in exceptional circumstances, the adoption agency that is handling the exchange of information feels that, although there is no objection to the provision of such information, to do so might constitute a risk to the person concerned or be against their interests. We felt that, where the agency decides to override an objection or consent, we should provide an independent review of that decision. Those are the two instances in which the independent review will be activated.

Andrew Love: To follow that point up, I have been told that there has been a mixed reception to the proposal. The main concerns appear to relate to the costs and how they will be attributed. Can you comment on that at this stage, after consultation?

James Paton: As the explanatory notes make clear, the costs of setting up the new independent review mechanism will be met centrally by the Government. The provision in the Bill that has raised some concern is actually an enabling provision that allows regulations to be made for agencies to meet some of the costs of the review. At the moment, if an adopter requests a reconsideration by the original agency, it is clear that they meet the costs. To clarify matters, I repeat that, as the part of the explanatory notes that deals with public expenditure points out, the costs of setting up the central body will be met centrally by the Government. It is not a self-funding system, as it were.

David Hinchliffe: Have the Government given any more thought to the difficulties, which I have mentioned in previous parliamentary debates, associated with turning down those who apply to adopt children? Giving the reasons for turning down such people can prove extremely destructive to their personal lives. I was given no clear answers before. Are we any clearer on that point?

James Paton: This is something that we have considered. It is an issue that applies now and will apply in future. The general principle is that, where somebody is turned down, they should be given as far as possible clear reasons why. Current guidance and regulations are to that effect, and we would expect future guidance and regulations to be to that effect. That recognises that there may be circumstances where information has been supplied in confidence by referees and cannot therefore be provided directly, or where sensitive information that is known about one party in the relationship is perhaps not known by the other party.
 Current guidance suggests that there are also instances involving confidential health information. It suggests that such information should be disclosed appropriately through the general practitioner, and we would expect that to continue. Where confidential information is provided by referees, current guidance suggests that agencies should attempt, as far as possible, to provide clear explanations, but where they cannot because of confidentiality, there is recognition that, in some cases, explanations will not be able to be communicated. We would not want to compromise or deter referees from being completely frank, so a recognition has been made that agencies cannot give full and complete reasons in all cases under current regulations. That will continue under the Bill. The general thrust is to try to provide as full an explanation as possible, but it is recognised that that is not possible in a number of circumstances. Nothing that we are doing changes that.

Henry Bellingham: I have a brief question. I should like to declare an interest. My wife and I are parents of an adopted child aged two and a bit and so could benefit from the Bill. With your permission, Mr. Hinchliffe, rather than mention this every time that I speak, I shall mention it now to put it on record. Let me put this question to you, Mr. Paton: should prospective adoptive families have access to information about a child's history?

James Paton: Yes. Current best practice, obligations and guidance are that prospective adoptive families should be provided with full information about a child's background to help them cope successfully and to promote a successful placement. Our intention is to continue that current best practice. The information provisions enable us to prescribe what information prospective adopters should receive about a child.

Henry Bellingham: Can you comment specifically on medical histories and their relevance?

James Paton: That is relevant. I think that I am right to say that current regulations—yes, regulation 12 of the current agency regulations—oblige adoption agencies to provide prospective adopters with information about the child, his state of health and medical background. That is relevant and we would expect such information to continue to be provided.

Sandra Walker: The current regulations specifically say the history of the child's health and the current state of his health.

Liz Blackman: We have had several conversations about that issue and I do not propose to go back over old ground because it is on record. On record last time, Mr. Paton, you said that an expert group was developing a code of practice around the issue of disclosure of information during the prospective adoption period. How has that developed?

James Paton: We published a draft practice guidance in August and we are currently consulting on it. I believe that that included the importance of the provision of information around the placement process.

Liz Blackman: So what is the time frame for the consultation?

Cathy Morgan: The closing date is 30 November.

James Paton: It is live and being taken forward.

Liz Blackman: That was the first point that I wanted to check. Secondly, I asked you a question about the difference in performance between authorities in terms of successful adoption rates. One issue that you identified as being key was the quality of record keeping, which still remains the case. Obviously, one needs good record keeping to support the disclosure of information, so I wonder where we are on that. I know of the taskforce that is going around and driving up best practice, but my understanding is that it has not, in the first instance, specifically targeted authorities that do not have such a good record. Perhaps, it should have done so because by targeting authorities with less success in this area, driving up their practice will happen more quickly. Will you make some comments on that?

Mark Ferrero: Could I answer that, please? The first wave of councils that the taskforce worked with included some that had very poor records, which was discovered when it visited them. It has done some good work in looking at how one should track children who are in the care of the council to see where they are, where they are placed and what their needs are. It has produced a tool to help other authorities get a better handle on their record keeping as a core element in their looking after children.
 It is worth adding that as part of the implementation exercise for the national adoption register we are asking all councils to use the taskforce's tool. We want them to examine the records of children in care for whom adoption has been identified as the plan to make sure that that is still appropriate. We want councils to review and update their records, and set them on a sound footing so that they can submit good quality data to the national adoption register. We are doing, and we have done, quite a lot to tackle this underlying problem that we all acknowledge as a big challenge, especially for those authorities where the turnover of staff is very high.

Julian Brazier: Amanda Finlay, I am sorry to put you on the spot, but I asked you a question on 24 April in Committee, and you promised to come back to me in writing. I shall therefore ask it to you again, although I know that we have had a little thing called a general election in between. To quote Sir Ronald Waterhouse:
``the Law Commission should inquire into the position of local authorities in relation to the publication of reports commissioned by them with a view to strengthening the defence of qualified privilege (or widening it) and giving guidance at least on their relationship with their insurers''. 
The point that I made then which underlies this is that it is not a legal requirement for local authorities to tell the truth, which astonished me when I discovered it but in fact it never has been. Furthermore, local authorities told us off the record that in some cases they can be required by their insurers to lie, and they can be in breach of their insurance policies if they do not do so. I see the hon. Member for Cardiff, West nodding. We are dealing with damaged children, and although one can see where the local authorities are coming from it is by any standards unsatisfactory that that should be the position.

Amanda Finlay: I understand from my supporting officials that I wrote to the Chairman. I am sorry that I have not got that letter with me. I ought to send you a copy and any further up-to-date information.

Julian Brazier: Thank you very much.

Tim Loughton: May I come back to the updating and review of records to which Mr. Ferrero referred. Is this being catered for within the remit of the £66 million that has been allocated? Given the enormous shortages in personnel in child welfare departments, are you convinced that that will be a meaningful updating of records that will provide a standard benchmark for all local authorities across the country in time for the new legislation?

Mark Ferrero: What I forgot to mention is the work that we are doing in parallel with that on the integrated children's system. We are developing a system to track and monitor all children in the looked after system with exemplars of how they should be recorded and how case notes should be made. That work is in hand. It is fair to say that the taskforce's work is aimed at addressing the immediate problems faced by social services departments in identifying the number of children that they have who are looked after and for whom adoption is the plan. Such a plan may not be appropriate because it might have been made months or even years in the past.
 The taskforce's work also helps to equip social services departments to participate properly in the register, which is a meaningful exercise. The £66 million is a funding stream through quality protects, which is addressing children's systems across the piece and looking at how they can be improved. 
 I take the point about social services departments that are short of staff, and that will be a problem for them. The Government are addressing that through their recruitment campaign. In the shorter term, however, we have the taskforce to go in, give hands-on help and spread best practice, which will help councils across the board address what is already their responsibility.

Tim Loughton: With respect, recruiting, if it works, and when it eventually brings on stream new social workers, is entirely irrelevant to information on children in care now, which you said you are updating and reviewing. How many children in care are we talking about on average per authority? The money is being stretched to pay for this review, as well as all manner of other things. It sounds like the right thing to do, but I am concerned that nothing like the detail that is needed will be available by the time the legislation comes into force and all the new extra responsibilities are placed on local authorities.

Mark Ferrero: The taskforce is looking at cases where adoption is the plan. Its remit is adoption and permanence, and that is my remit. On the broader, looked-after children system, we have to remember that most children in care return to their birth families and are in care for a relatively short period. That is being addressed through the integrated children system work that we are doing. There are already responsibilities on local authorities to record and track the children of whom they are corporate parents, but we recognise that they need help in actually maintaining those records and keeping them up to date. That is why we are doing this extra work to help them improve.

Meg Munn: I have two brief questions on intercountry adoption. First, in what way will it tighten up the issue of the countries from which children can be adopted?

Cathy Morgan: The Bill, as it stands, has been strengthened in three main places. In clause 80, we have introduced a new offence. Where a child has been adopted overseas by a British resident in the previous six months and brought into the country, that resident must have been through the proper approval and assessment procedures. The intention is to catch anybody wishing to adopt from an overseas country and bring the child back when that is not for the purposes of adoption. The legislation as it stands is for bringing a child into the UK for the purposes of adoption, and that means adopting the child in a UK court.
 Where somebody goes to another country, adopts, brings the child back and says, ``Actually, we don't want to adopt the child here,'' we would be unable to catch them under current legislation, whether or not the adoption order is recognised in respect of the designated list. Part of clause 80 would prevent that, because they would be bringing in a child with an adoption order that was less than six months old. We will also bring into force, through clause 83, restrictions on which adoption orders are actually recognised. There will be clear criteria set out in regulations, explaining the sort of systems that a country must have for that adoption order to be recognised under UK law. 
 Finally, we are also doing some other work—it is not actually Bill-related, but it will effectively link in with it—on the ratification of The Hague convention. It is acknowledged that the majority of the best country systems are those belonging to countries that have already signed up to The Hague convention on intercountry adoption. At the moment, it is not open to British residents to apply to a great number of those countries because the UK has not ratified. When the UK ratifies, those systems will be open to UK residents. That should mean that people will be able to adopt from overseas, and can be sure that they are going through decent systems.

Meg Munn: Will you clarify what the Bill means in terms of which of those people who wish to adopt from abroad will be able to undertake home studies?

Cathy Morgan: The only people who will be able to complete a home study, whether anybody wishes to adopt from the UK itself or from abroad, will be voluntary adoption agencies and local authorities.

Sandra Gidley: The Bill makes it quite clear that only married couples can adopt jointly, and I am concerned that, ultimately, the best place might not be found for some children. What would be the repercussions of allowing unmarried couples to adopt jointly, and why was the decision taken against providing for that in the Bill?

James Paton: The decision was taken to continue with the current legal position whereby only a married couple may adopt jointly. Broadly, the adoption law review looked at this in the early 1990s and suggested that the current position should remain. In relation to the joint adoption of a child, it was felt that married couples, given the publicly recognised commitment that they had given and their legal obligations to each other, were more likely to provide the child with the stability and security that it needed. That was the adoption law review's conclusion. The Government's view was that those proposals were broadly right, but the Secretary of State said on Second Reading that the issue is subject to debate in this context, as well as in wider contexts, and that having heard the views of the Committee, the position would be considered in that light.
 It is worth saying that in providing for joint adoption solely by married couples we are in line with the majority of European countries, even the majority of those that have introduced partnership registration schemes. Many of those specifically exclude joint adoption, although some include it.

Sandra Gidley: It occurs to me that we review this legislation once in a lifetime, and it will be a long time before we will be able to review it easily.
We now have the Human Rights Act 1998, which we have to take into consideration. Are you confident that the Bill's provisions are acceptable according to article 8 of the Human Rights Act?

James Paton: As with all the provisions in the Bill, the Secretary of State has signed the section 19 declaration that the provisions are on balance compatible with the ECHR and, as I said earlier, that view is clearly shared by a large number of other European countries.

Sandra Gidley: Are you confident? You said the Secretary of State had signed it; you did not actually say whether you were confident.

James Paton: That is a different thing.

David Hinchliffe: Can you say that again, Mr. Paton?

James Paton: The declaration cannot be signed unless the advice is that on balance the provisions are compatible with the convention. There may be challenges in this area, as there may be in any area, but that is the position.

David Hinchliffe: I raised this question in the debate in the last Parliament in terms of the conflict between the provision and the welfare principle in terms of the child's best interests, whereby if it was in the child's best interests to be adopted by an unmarried couple, it could not happen.

James Paton: One partner could adopt the child and the other could acquire parental responsibilities.

David Hinchliffe: That is not quite the answer, though, is it?

James Paton: The law review's conclusions were based on promoting stability for the child where a joint adoption was being proposed and on the fact that married couples had a legal relationship and a publicly-signalled commitment to each other that meant that it was more likely that stability and security would result.

Meg Munn: Precisely on that point, looked-after children can be placed with foster parents who are unmarried. The child may then be in a situation that everyone agrees should be made more permanent. The Bill would allow for a special guardianship order, but it would not allow for the child to be adopted. Is that not a problem in terms of promoting permanency? For some children, being adopted is what will promote their feelings of stability and permanency.

James Paton: It would not prevent them from being adopted; it would prevent them from being jointly adopted by an unmarried couple.

Julian Brazier: May I ask about the legal arrangements in dissolution following an adoption? Statistically, it is much more likely that an unmarried union will dissolve than a married couple will divorce, but there is clear provision in divorce courts for what happens to children, property and so on. What will be the arrangements concerning the parting of an unmarried couple who have either adopted or chosen the new special guardianship order, as they will be allowed to do? That will surely be very complicated; divorce law cannot simply be picked off the shelf under such circumstances.

James Paton: No, it cannot, although I must turn to my legal advice here.

Sandra Walker: This is quite a tricky one. The current adoption law provides for joint adoption by married couples, so that fits into the framework of legislation generally. If the couple subsequently divorce, the child will be treated as the child of the family and the arrangements for the child's continued upbringing and maintenance will be dealt with in consequence of that dissolution.
 Obviously, if a couple are unmarried, a much more difficult situation would have to be dealt with. For example, in relation to the rules governing property, it is open to anybody to make a will so that they could dispose of their property in accordance with their testamentary disposition. If they die intestate, the rules relating to statutory intestacy that would normally apply to spouses would not apply, but the issue, including adopted children, would be treated in the same way, under statutory intestacy. 
 In relation to the special guardianship orders, we have not made any specific provision for inheritance rights. Obviously, it would be open to special guardians to dispose of their property in accordance with their testamentary disposition.

Julian Brazier: To focus on the last point, will not complicated questions arise on the dissolution of an unmarried partnership in which both partners had jointly entered into a special guardianship of a child?

Sandra Walker: Those are issues that we will need to look at in the context of registered partnerships. At the moment, they do not exist. When we talk about joint residence orders and joint special guardianship orders, we are talking about couples doing those jointly and orders being made jointly, not in terms of a registered partnership that adopts—or, sorry, in whose favour a special guardianship is made.

Julian Brazier: It seems that we are putting another layer of legal complexity on to a child who has already had a lot of that in their life.

Kevin Brennan: I accept that last point, but do not such situations arise all the time anyway with children born to unmarried couples who subsequently part? I accept the hon. Gentleman's point that the children are already going through a lot of legal processes, but the provision does not introduce totally insurmountable or unfamiliar problems.

Sandra Walker: I would not dissent from that.

Tim Loughton: How strenuous is the vetting system for the unmarried partner of an adopter? If you are not proposing to change the status quo in the Bill, are there any proposals to tighten it up? It is often the unmarried partner who is the threat where abuse of a child is concerned. Are you satisfied that provisions are strenuous enough at the moment?

James Paton: I think that I am right in saying that the assessment process would look at the single person's relationships and would need to consider the background of someone with whom they were living. I believe that the Bill allows for new provisions for enhanced criminal record checks for adults living in the household of prospective adopters. The Bill allows us--[Interruption.] Ms Morgan is saying that there is an obligation under the 1983 regulations to conduct background checks on adults living with prospective adopters. We would want them to be thoroughly checked.

Tim Loughton: That is nothing new; you are going back to 1983. What has changed in the past few years, or has nothing changed?

James Paton: We would expect, under existing regulations, that the background of the person in the prospective adoptive house would be checked. That is an obligation under the 1983 regulations on adoption agencies that we would expect to continue.

Tim Loughton: Yes, but everyone living in the household must be checked at the moment; we know that. I am saying that there is a case for making more strenuous checks of the unmarried partner. If both are not open to the initial vetting process because both cannot be the unmarried adoptive parent, are you going to balance that by making more rigorous vetting of the unmarried partner who cannot be the adopter because you are keeping the status quo in the Bill?

James Paton: We would expect them to be checked out, but it is fair to say that we are having a fundamental review of the whole assessment process, so we could look at that. My understanding of agency best practice at the moment is that in reality both will be assessed in the same way. A stable partner will be scrutinised during the agency's assessment process.

David Hinchliffe: Mr. Dawson, do you want to ask a question?

Hilton Dawson: My point has been answered.

Meg Munn: Surely you have shown the nonsense, Mr. Paton, of not going ahead with allowing unmarried couples to adopt. Current practice is--I was following it until a year ago--that both partners are assessed in exactly the same way as if they were both adopting. By not putting the provision in the Bill, we are denying the presence of proper legal safeguards and the ability for us to be sure that that is so.

James Paton: I think that, as I said at the beginning, the Government believe that the proposals are broadly right, largely for the reasons that the adoption law review set out: the increased chance of providing stability and security in the joint adoption of a child when there has been a legally recognised public commitment between the two partners. However, again, as the Secretary of State said, we shall be interested to hear views at the Committee and it is right that there should be a debate on the matter.

Hilton Dawson: Given that view, is there not a gross inconsistency in special guardianship, which confers parental responsibility and is, therefore, a significant option for permanency, being open to unmarried couples?

James Paton: I do not believe that there is. First, special guardianship is clearly not adoption. Adoption is a complete legal transfer from one family to another; special guardianship retains the legal link with the birth parents, who retain parental responsibility. Secondly, adoption is irrevocable, whereas a special guardianship order can be revoked. It is a different order of legal permanence and security, so I do not believe that a direct analogy can be drawn with a transfer of parental responsibility.

Jonathan Djanogly: One thing that has come out of this exchange is that I am slightly concerned that we do not know what special guardianship involves in the round. The matter arose in relation to inheritance law, for instance. Might it not be helpful if a paper were prepared identifying the different areas that must be considered? We could then consider whether it is appropriate that inheritance, for example, should be addressed in the provisions. We do not really know. This is a whole new area.

David Hinchliffe: Do you want to respond to that point, Mr. Paton? Is it possible to give further information to the Committee on that area—by Friday, perhaps?

James Paton: Of course that is possible. I am quite happy to give a fuller explanation of what special guardianship involves—that would be valuable. This is a new area, which I am conscious the Committee did not have a chance to get into in detail because of the general election. We are interested in people's views on it, so we will certainly provide you with that.

David Hinchliffe: We should be very grateful.

Jonathan R Shaw: On the registration of private fostering, is the Department satisfied that schedule 7 of the Children Act provides satisfactory protection to children who are privately fostered?

Mark Ferrero: We acknowledge that the issue of private fostering is important and of concern. The difficulty lies in social services departments knowing that a private fostering situation exists.

Jonathan R Shaw: The Department of Health does not know how many children are privately fostered—it is estimated at 8,000 to 10,000—so we do not know where they are or where they are living.

Mark Ferrero: We do not have reliable data. It is a very difficult area on which to get reliable data.

Jonathan R Shaw: The key test for legislation is whether it works. From what you have said, from the evidence that we have received and from my experience of working in a social services department, existing legislation does not work. Would you agree with that?

Mark Ferrero: The Children Act provides a framework of protection for children in the community and places duties on local social services departments to protect the interests and safety of children in their area. I assume that you are referring to the proposals in the report that was recently published by the British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering on private foster carers being registered. However, it is difficult to see what would make private foster carers register when they do not notify.

Jonathan R Shaw: It is not just BAAF that makes such comments; Sir William Utting's report and Lord Laming's report—in 1993, I think—on the social services inspectorate say that also. The proposals are not new. On whether people would register if there were registration, as is proposed, one could ask the same about childminders. Has the Department considered the fact that we require childminders to register with Ofsted, but we do not have the same registration scheme for private fosterers? Children are looked after for part of the day by a childminder; privately fostered children are cared for for years, and nobody knows where they are.

Mark Ferrero: The critical point is that the local social services department knows that the arrangement has taken place. The legal framework currently requires private foster carers to notify their local authority that they have taken a child into their care. If the child leaves their care, they are required to notify the authority and say where the child has gone. The problem is one of professional and public awareness of the current legal framework. Once a local authority is aware that a child is in a private fostering arrangement, it has duties to visit the child on a regular basis and look after its safety. The critical point is to improve public and professional awareness of the duty to notify, and to make people aware of the offence that goes with the failure to notify.

Jonathan R Shaw: But that simply has not happened. I know that there have been publicity campaigns, such as a leaflet, but we have not seen an improvement. We are talking about a vulnerable group of children, so the issue must be about private foster carers notifying the local authority, which is not happening. Surely the state should be coming at this matter from the other way, too; it does so for childminding and day care, but not for private foster carers. Have you had a discussion with the Local Government Association about the mechanics of setting up a registration scheme?

Mark Ferrero: I do not honestly know the answer to that, but I am sure that I can get a note about it.

Hilton Dawson: Could you explain the problem to me? It seems that we are not talking about a vast number of children. Childminders are registered and the very informal arrangements of the past for looking after children have been brought under statutory requirements. What is the problem over private fostering?

Mark Ferrero: Essentially, we are dealing with private arrangements. There is a balance to be struck between a private arrangement and the role of the state in such circumstances. We have a legal framework in place that requires notification of these arrangements. However, we have still to raise general public awareness. We just referred to a leaflet that was aimed at professionals. It was aimed not only at social services professionals, but at all professionals that come into contact with children in the community, such as health care professionals and so on. We need to raise public consciousness of the need to notify a private fostering arrangement to the same level as it is on childminding. Everybody knows that the local authority has a legitimate role in childminding. There is not a good general public awareness of the need, the role and the responsibility of social services in private fostering cases.
 To go back to the registration point, I still am not convinced that creating a registration arrangement would mean that more private foster carers would come forward to be registered. If they do not notify now, what in a registration scheme would make them come forward to register?

David Hinchliffe: I am conscious that this is an important area, and there will be opportunities to pursue it later in Committee. May I thank our witnesses for their contributions, which have been most helpful? Mr. Paton, would you mind remaining at the Table, as last time, because, as you know, we like your company and appreciate your advice on technical points. Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.
 The witnesses withdrew.

Memorandum from the British Agencies for AdoptionAnd Fostering - 1. INTRODUCTION

BAAF submitted evidence to the Special Select Committee on this Bill's predecessor and was also invited to give oral evidence before the Committee. We are pleased to have the opportunity to submit further evidence. This memorandum: 
 —Draws the Committee's attention to concerns raised in the earlier evidence that remain unresolved, with additional information where appropriate 
 —Welcomes improvements made to the Bill 
 —Comments on matters newly introduced into the Bill 
 —Considers the relationship between the Bill's provisions and the Children Act 1989 
 In terms of the evidence presented earlier, all of it remains relevant, except parts of paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Memorandum which dealt with dispensation of parental consent, placement for adoption and placement orders. We set out below (paragraph 3) our comments on the relevant provisions in the Bill as it now stands. The other main difference is that clause 110 of the Bill now makes provision for support services for children and families affected by special guardianship orders as advocated in paragraphs 13.2 and 13.3 of the earlier evidence 
 The two new matters commented on are clauses 53 - 62 and 76 concerning access to information and the amended provisions dealing with the Adoption & Children Act Register (clauses 115 - 119) and the payment of inter-agency fees.

2. CHANGES TO THE ADOPTION SUPPORT FRAMEWORK—CLAUSES 2 - 4 AND 8

We welcome the fact that the Bill now provides for a wider group of people (people—not only children—who may be or have been adopted, birth parents and adoptive parents) to be entitled to adoption support services, and also the fact that these provisions are no longer restricted to cases of children adopted after implementation of the new legislation. Many of the other concerns raised in our previous evidence, however, remain. In particular, BAAF recommends that there should be a statutory duty on local authorities to provide the adoption support services that their assessment shows to be needed. 
 We also note the provision in clause 8 regarding adoption support agencies. The possibility of having registered agencies available to undertake limited tasks, such as the provision of counselling to adopted adults, has been canvassed in the past and we would in general support this. However we would seek further definition of the term ''adoption support agency''. Careful consideration is needed about the desirability of this proposal, as we are concerned lest relatively small self-help groups may be overwhelmed by the burden of registration.

3. PLACEMENT ORDERS AND DISPENSATION WITH PARENTAL CONSENT - a) Conditions for grant of placement orders

Changes to what is now clause 20 (clause 17 in the earlier Bill) address one important concern raised in our previous evidence. We note that under the new proposals only local authorities (not voluntary adoption agencies) will be able to apply for placement orders and a court will not be able to make an order unless either the child is already subject to a care order under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 or the court is satisfied that the conditions set out in section 31(2) of that Act (significant harm or likelihood of significant harm) are satisfied. This avoids the risk that children who had been accommodated by the local authority at their parents' request—perhaps initially because of some temporary family difficulty—might become subject to placement orders against their parents' wishes and without even the section 31 grounds ever having been met. 
 We welcome the fact that this concern has been addressed. It may be however that the new framework goes too far in removing the right of a court to make a placement order with parental consent even if the section 31 grounds are not satisfied. 
 In a small number of cases where parents or perhaps a single mother, wish to relinquish a child for adoption, the agency is faced with a dilemma in that it knows that another family member, particularly perhaps a father without parental responsibility, would wish to oppose adoption, or because it is prevented by the mother's opposition from ascertaining the views of extended family members. This situation arose in the case of Re G [2001] 1FLR 646. In this case the mother requested her infant's adoption and refused to disclose the identity of the father, so that the local authority had no way of ascertaining his views or carrying out any kind of assessment to see whether it would be more appropriate for the child to be brought up by his father. In order to avoid the potential harm that would arise for the child if he was placed for adoption and then, only many months later, on the hearing of the adoption application the court were to direct that the father's views be ascertained and the placement be possibly disrupted, the local authority wished to test out the court's views in advance of placement. To do this they invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court and sought a declaration as to the appropriateness of placing the child without making any contact with the father. The President of the Family Division commended this course of action. The framework of the Children Act 1989 limits the circumstances where local authorities may invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. 
 BAAF recommends that the Bill should provide that a local authority may apply for a placement order with the consent of each parent or guardian with parental responsibility and thus seek the court's directions as to the involvement or otherwise of another parent or, say, grandparents.

b) Dispensation with parental consent

Although this change to placement orders removes one of our major concerns about the inadequacy of the grounds for dispensing with parental consent, it does not completely remove the problem. If the status of parents is to mean anything, it must surely mean that it makes a difference whether or not they agree to adoption. If they do agree, the court and the agency must take into account all the matters set out in clause 1, including the parents' views, and the court must not, by virtue of clause 1(6) make any order under the Adoption and Children Act unless it considers that making the order would be better for the child than not doing so. In other words, the court must not make an adoption order unless the child's welfare requires it. If on the other hand the parents do not consent, the court must again take into account all the matters listed in clause 1, including the parents' opposition, but clause 50 provides that it may dispense with parental consent ''if the child's welfare requires it.'' It is hard to see therefore that the Bill makes any real distinction between the situation where the parents consent and that where they disagree. If the requirement for parental consent is to have any meaning, then the test for dispensing with it must have some content which acknowledges a different between cases where consent is forthcoming and those where it is not. Without this it is questionable whether the ''proportionality'' required under the European Convention is satisfied—i.e. that the adoption (a major infringement of the parents right to family life under article 8 of the Convention) is ''necessary in a democratic society''. We are still inclined to favour the form of words suggested by the Adoption Law Review Team, that adoption would be so significantly better for the child than any other option as to justify overriding the parents' wishes. Another possibility might be to provide that parental consent could be dispensed with only if the court was satisfied that it would be impossible for the child's developmental needs to be met without an adoption order. (''Development'' is defined in the Children Act to mean ''physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development'', and the recently established framework for the assessment of children focuses on their developmental needs.)

4. ADOPTION BY MARRIED COUPLES OR SINGLE PEOPLE

We reiterate the concern expressed in our previous evidence (paragraph 9) at the failure to use this chance to amend the law by allowing two people living in a stable union—whether heterosexual or homosexual—to adopt. Since that evidence was presented, BAAF has commissioned a MORI poll on attitudes to adoption, chiefly with the object of refining recruitment initiatives. One of the questions asked was about the respondents' attitude to the restriction of adoption orders to married couples or single people. 68% of respondents expressed the view that unmarried couples living in a stable relationship should be allowed to adopt, and only 18% disagreed with this proposition (a copy of the relevant findings is attached at annex 1.) The idea of adoption agencies operating ''blanket bans'' on certain categories of would-be adopters is rightly condemned; this current restriction enshrines in the law a blanket ban of its own. The assessment process would, as it already does, focus on the strength and stability of the relationship between the two adults as a critical factor in the decision on approval, and the court would, as it does in any other case, still have the final say. 
 At a time when considerable debate is taking place both within and outside Parliament about the possibility of some form of registration of relationships outside marriage it would seem regrettable to draft adoption legislation in such a way as to exclude the possibility of permitting couples whose unions were registered to apply jointly for adoption. 
 BAAF strongly recommends that the Bill should allow for unmarried couples to make a joint legal commitment to a child through adoption.

5. REGISTRATION OF PRIVATE FOSTERING

Again we would repeat our plea that this opportunity should be seized to protect a highly vulnerable group of children by legislation for the registration of private foster carers. Since our previous evidence (see paragraph 15) BAAF has commissioned an investigative report on private fostering, to be published on November 12th. The executive summary of that report and the recommendations it contains are attached at annex 2. 
 BAAF strongly believes that legislation should require local authorities to maintain a register of approved private foster carers.

6. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ABOUT A PERSON'S ADOPTION CLAUSES 53 - 62 AND 76

We have very serious concerns about these clauses as currently drafted. Not only are they enormously complex but they establish an extremely prescriptive framework which is likely to prove unhelpful in practice. Restrictions on disclosure of information are, for the first time, supported by a criminal sanction imposed on voluntary adoption agencies which disclose information contrary to the regulations made under these provisions. Most seriously of all, in our view, the provisions in clause 58 would make it impossible for adoption agencies to disclose to an adopted adult the information needed to enable him or her to obtain a copy of their original birth certificate if the birth parent had made an objection to the disclosure of this information, thus reversing the right introduced in the Children Act 1975 for an adopted adult to obtain their original birth certificate. The denial of this right would also deny the adopted person the opportunity to have their name entered on the Adoption Contact Register (clause 77) indicating. 
 It would not be putting it too strongly to say that there is consternation among BAAF's member agencies and others at this proposed change. Although the PIU report pointed to inconsistencies between agencies in the provision of information, there was never any suggestion that the law should be amended to restrict access to birth record information for adopted adults. It is almost exactly 26 years since the law was changed in England and Wales to give adopted adults the right to obtain their original birth certificate. That change was introduced following widespread consultation and debate, and although during the parliamentary debate on the proposals concerns were expressed that birth parents would suffer distress and embarrassment if their adopted children suddenly approached them, in practice these fears have not been realised. Not only have adopted people who have taken advantage of the right to obtain information greatly valued this, but there is no clear evidence that parents have in fact been disturbed or upset even when approached for direct contact by their adopted child. The majority in fact have welcomed such an approach, although it is of course preferable for any approach to be made through an intermediary. 
 In the light of this it is somewhat hard to understand what has led to the inclusion on the new provisions in the Bill. It may be that these provisions arise out of an attempt to fit these disclosure arrangements into the framework of the Data Protection Act. This of course in principle allows individuals to see information about themselves held by public bodies and restricts disclosure of information to third parties. In certain circumstances it does permit the disclosure of third party information or, by preference, the disclosure of information without disclosing the identity of the third party to whom it relates. The difficulty is that this framework is not well suited to family relationships. The birth of a child is not information belonging only to the child, the mother, or the father. The law requires the birth to be registered in a statutory register to which the public have access, and most people are entitled to obtain a certified copy of the register entry relating to their own birth. An adopted person cannot obtain his or her original birth certificate without knowledge of his or her original name. The Children Act 1975 ensured that such information could be available to any adopted person who sought it. What is now proposed will disadvantage those (it may well be only a small number) whose parents choose to deny them the right to obtain the information. 
 BAAF strongly recommends that the right of adopted adults to have access to their original birth certificates should be retained.

7. THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT REGISTER

We welcome the addition of the provision enabling regulations to be made extending the use of the Register to other types of placement such as special guardianship. We also note with interest the provision of clause 116(3) which would permit the register provider, in accordance with regulations, to act as broker for the payment of interagency fees, and look forward to discussion of the detailed implications of this.

8. INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION

We note that clause 80 extends the restrictions on bringing children into the country to include cases where the child has been adopted abroad but without the proper (UK) procedures being followed. We appreciate the intention behind this provision but the precise wording of the clause may require further consideration. Greater safeguards are in practice likely to be achieved by the exercise of great care by the Secretary of State in deciding which countries' adoptions may be specified as ''overseas adoptions'' under clause 83.

9. CONSISTENCY WITH THE CHILDREN ACT 1989

One of the objectives of this legislation, which we thoroughly applaud, is to bring adoption law into line with the Children Act 1989. Unfortunately, however, the Bill as currently drafted would leave some glaring inconsistencies with the Children Act framework. In particular these relate to the distortion of the Children Act framework covering children accommodated by the local authority under voluntary arrangements. Unlike the Children Act the provisions in the Bill: 
 —vest parental responsibility in the local authority or adoption agency without any court order 
 —vest parental responsibility in prospective adopters on placement without a court order 
 —place severe restrictions on the right of the parent to remove the child from accommodation—even if the child has not yet been placed for adoption 
 —authorise the local authority to retain a child against the parents' wishes if the local authority intends to apply for a placement order (whereas in similar circumstances under the Children Act the local authority would be required to apply for an emergency protection order). 
 There is also inconsistency in the provisions governing applications by foster carers for adoption orders and applications by foster carers for residence or special guardianship orders and this should be resolved. 
 A paper setting these points out in more detail is attached at annex 3. 
Table 6
Table 6 continued
Table 7
Table 7 continuedAnnex 2A VERY PRIVATE PRACTICEAN INVESTIGATION INTO PRIVATE FOSTERING

Annex 2 - A VERY PRIVATE PRACTICE - AN INVESTIGATION INTO PRIVATE FOSTERING

A Very Private Practice: An investigation into private fostering highlights the risks to which privately fostered children are exposed and provides powerful case materials. It sets out a programme for reform and urges that the Government acts urgently to ensure that these children are protected. Below, we provide the Executive Summary followed by BAAF's Programme for Reform.

Executive summary

The term ``private fostering'' is used to describe the situation when a child of up to 16 years of age (18 if disabled) is in the care of someone who is not his or her parent or relative for 28 days or more. A relative, under the Children Act 1989, is defined as grandparents, siblings, step-parents, aunts or uncles (i.e. brothers or sisters of the child's parents), or other persons with parental responsibility. 
 Some parents will always need to make use of private foster care. But the needs of their children for support, protection and a healthy physical and emotional development are no different from those of any other children. 
 Privately fostered children include children placed with strangers for lengthy periods, often while their parents pursue studies, work commitments or live overseas; adolescents who are temporarily estranged from their families; children who attend language schools and independent schools in the UK; children from abroad on holiday or exchange visits; children who are asylum seekers; and some children brought to the UK from overseas with a view to adoption. 
 As there is no register of private foster carers, families have to find these carers themselves. They may do this through word of mouth or informal networks. The Department of Health says that parents are responsible for ensuring that the people they place their children with are suitable. However, parents have no access to criminal record checks and most will have little understanding of the possible risks that their children face. 
 There is no accurate information about the numbers of children who are privately fostered. Current estimates suggest that 8 - 10,000 children are privately fostered in the UK, a significant majority of whom are black children of West African origin. The Department of Health ceased to collect statistics in 1990 on the grounds that they were meaningless. 
 The majority of privately fostered West African children live with white families, often in rural communities where the child will experience separation from his or her culture and may encounter racism. Many private foster carers have little understanding of the difficulties these children may face or the impact on them of separation from their birth families. The long-term effects can be a confusion about identity, relationship problems, underachievement, insecurity, poor development, and learning difficulties. 
 Some West African families have lost their children when they have been adopted by private foster carers or when children have become so detached from their parents to not want to, or be able to, return to them. 
 The Children Act 1989 introduced changes in England and Wales. These were to place a duty on both carer and birth parent to notify an intention to place a child in private foster care, and limiting the numbers of children whom a carer could foster to three. Despite these duties, it is generally accepted that the great majority of private fostering arrangements are never notified to the authorities. 
 Local authorities have fairly minimal responsibilities under the Children Act 1989. Essentially, they have to satisfy themselves about the welfare of the child; receive notification from parents, carers, and third parties; visit the child regularly and offer advice and support. They do not have the power to approve private foster carers and have only limited powers to prohibit a person from privately fostering. 
 The overwhelming majority of social services departments do not give any priority to privately fostered children. In many cases, no services are provided in the belief that there are no such children within the authority's boundaries. A few local authorities have developed good practice initiatives and have actively promoted services to meet the needs of privately fostered children in their area. 
 There is a dangerous inequality in the way that local authorities are charged to deal with those foster carers whom they recruit and register for children in the local authority's care and those who offer a private service. The statutory requirement and regulatory framework which apply to child minders who will look after children for part of the day, are much more rigorous than for children who can be separated from their parents for indefinite periods. 
 Sir William Utting, in his review of the safeguards for children living away from home (1997), said that there were three options: to leave things as they were; to deregulate on the basis that what existed was unenforceable; or to enforce regulation and introduce a requirement to approve and register private foster carers because of the risk to children. He said that the status quo was `the worst of all worlds as it seems to give the appearance of safeguards while in practice they are not complied with'. Deregulation would `abandon children to their fate' and create a ``honeypot'' for abusers'. He recommended that private foster carers should be approved in the same way as other foster carers. 
 The recommendations for change made by Sir William Utting in his report—which was commissioned by Government—were rejected in 1998. Almost all Utting's other recommendations were accepted by Government. The UK Joint Working Party on Foster Care in their report in 1999 referred to the `high potential for abuse and neglect` and urged legislation requiring local authorities to maintain a register of approved private foster carers at the earliest opportunity. The Government instead promised a public awareness campaign which would take place in 1999. The only ``campaign'' to date has been a distribution of leaflets to professionals and letters to Directors reminding them of their responsibilities. 
 BAAF's investigative report, written by Terry Philpot, highlights graphically the risks to which privately fostered children are exposed, providing powerful case study material and making urgent recommendations for Government actions to ensure these children are protected. 
 In 2001, Victoria Climbie, a privately fostered child, died tragically at the hands of her carer and her carer's partner.

A programme for reform - ACTION FOR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

1. Legislation should be introduced to require local authorities to maintain a register of private foster carers within their area who are approved as suitable. This register would be available to birth parents who wished to make arrangements for their child. It should be possible for a private foster carer to be registered as generally available or alternatively to be approved for a specific child already known to them in the same way that foster carers can be approved to foster a specific child. 
 2. It should be an offence to foster a child privately if the carer is unregistered or to place a child with an unregistered carer. 
 3. Each local authority should be required to make an annual statistical return to the Department of Health detailing the number of private foster carers registered, the numbers deregistered, and the number of placements in its area. 
 4. Standards should be published by the Department of Health with the criteria against which private foster carers should be assessed for registration. These should be based on current standards for childminders and include elements of the National Standards for Foster Care. 
 5. The National Care Standards Commission should be required to inspect the private fostering service of Local Authorities in England and Wales as already required in Scotland. 
 6. The children Act 1989 should be amended to make explicit that the stipulation of 28 days as the period after which the child is deemed to be privately fostered need not be continuous. 
 7. Each local authority should be required to appoint a designated social work manager with specific responsibility for private fostering overall. 
 8. Local authorities should have a statutory duty to provide counselling and advice to birth parents considering having their child privately fostered. 
 9. The local authority should have a duty to offer support to young people who were in private foster care three months before their 16th birthday. 
 10. Private foster carers who have children removed from their care by the Local Authority should be notified to the Protection of Children Act List. 
 11. The Government should have a continuing campaign, backing any efforts by local authorities, to inform professionals, birth parents and private foster carers of their legal responsibilities. 
 12. A Code of Practice should be published by the Department of Health to recognise the differing circumstances of children who are privately fostered, for example, those in host families when on vacation from independent schools; those attending summer schools; those in the UK for medical treatment. 
 13. Private fostering should be integral to all relevant government initiatives addressed at improving services for children, for example, the Quality Protects Programme.

Action by Local Authorities/Social Services Departments

1. Each authority should address private fostering specifically in its Children's Services Plan. 
 2. The principles of the Children Act 1989 - including the need to consider a child's religion, race, culture and language - should be incorporated in all local authority guidelines and policies on private fostering. 
 3. Local authorities should treat private foster carers as part of the spectrum of local childcare and ensure that they are supported and knowledgeable about assistance and benefits to which they may be entitled. 
 4. Private fostering arrangements should always be the subject of a written contract between parents and foster carers. 
 5. Written contracts should detail access by the child to the parents and local authorities should satisfy themselves that the amount of contact may allow the child to maintain an attachment to his or her parents. Local authorities should therefore bear in mind their duties under schedule 2 paragraph 10 of the Children Act, to promote contact between children in need living apart from their family and the family. 
 6. The local authority should satisfy itself that the care will be for a stated period although that can be extended by mutual consent of the parent and the carer. Parents should be informed, in detail and in writing, by the local authority of the possible consequences of private fostering for their children and their relationship with their children. 
 7. Local authorities that become aware of a private fostered child who has moved from another local authority area with his/her private carer should be required to inform their previous local authority. 
 8. A local authority which is aware of the intention of a private carer to move outside the area should inform the receiving authority. 
 9. Professionals, for example, GPs, Health Visitors, Teachers, Housing Officers—should have a duty to inform the social services department when they suspect a child is being privately fostered.

Annex 3 - INCONSISTENCY WITH THE CHILDREN ACT 1989

One of the aims of the Bill is to align adoption law with the Children Act 1989. In a number of respects, however, it fails to achieve this. Indeed, in certain cases, it widens rather than diminishes inconsistencies between the two frameworks.

a) Adoption Placements by Consent

Clause 18 provides that an adoption agency is ``authorised'' to place a child for adoption when each parent or guardian has consented to placement (whether with a specific adoptive family, or with a family to be chosen by the agency). Such consent may in some cases be given when a child is already subject to a care order, but in other cases and, in particular, in the small number of cases where parents wish to relinquish an infant for adoption, the child will almost always be ''accommodated'' by the agency or local authority under the Children Act 1989. (For no obvious reason the Bill also provides that in any case where a child is ''authorised'' to be placed for adoption by a local authority, the child is to be ''treated'' as looked after by the local authority, even if he or she is not.) 
 The Children Act and the Regulations made under it provide a clear framework covering the ''accommodation'' of children, but the Bill departs from this framework in several respects if a child is accommodated and parents consent to placement for adoption. Section 20(8) of the Children Act makes it clear that where a child is accommodated by the local authority (this being an entirely voluntary arrangement) the parent is at liberty to remove the child from the accommodation whenever he or she wishes. (There is an exception where a parent with a residence order wishes the child to remain accommodated; in this situation the other parent may not remove the child). Section 20(8) of the Children Act is specifically excluded by clause 29(6) of the Bill. The effect of this is that if a parent consents to placement for adoption, but then changes her mind, she cannot remove the child. This applies even where the child has not yet been placed with prospective adopters. Furthermore, a parent who did remove a child would be committing an offence under clause 29(8) of the Bill. A parent in this position is required to notify the local authority or agency that she wishes the child returned., and they then, even if the child has not been placed with adopters, have up to 14 days to return the child. Where the child is not in an adoptive placement it is impossible to see any justification for this fortnight's delay. For some children, particularly older children, it might well be desirable to have time to prepare them for the move, and in many cases it may be helpful if the local authority have time to help the parent put in place necessary practical help, but this applies equally to all accommodated children. Where a parent requests the return of a child under s.20(8) of the Children Act, the local authority may be able to negotiate a delayed or phased return in the interests of the child, but this is, rightly, subject to the parents' agreement. The same should be true of children for whom consent to adoptive placement has been given and is then withdrawn, and the child is not yet placed for adoption. 
 Where a child has already been placed with prospective adopters by agreement, but no adoption or residence order application has been lodged at the court, clause 31 provides for the agency to give notice to the adoptive parents of the need to return the child. Again, the prospective adopters are given 14 days to comply, but when they do return the child, he or she must be immediately returned by the agency to the parents. Some time delay is probably justifiable where the child is already placed: the present adoption law provides for up to seven days in these circumstances. It is arguable however that 14 days is too long. 
 The above provisions are the more concerning when it is recalled that consent to placement for adoption (as opposed to consent to adoption) may be validly given by a mother within 6 weeks of the child's birth. It is quite unacceptable that a mother who, perhaps, 3 weeks after a child's birth, gave consent to placement, and two weeks later changed her mind, could be subject to criminal prosecution if she removed the child from its temporary foster placement.

b) Parental Responsibility

Under the Children Act parental responsibility is not usually conferred on a non-parent except by court order. The only existing exception to this is the appointment of a guardian to act after the death of a parent. (Under amendments to the Children Act in this Bill there will also be a power for a step parent to be given parental responsibility by agreement with the child's parents, but it is important to note that this parental responsibility is shared and the appointee is not put in a position to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility by the parents.) By clause 24 of the Bill, parental responsibility is given to the adoption agency not only on the making of a placement order by a court, but also by the mere fact of the parents' agreeing to placement for adoption, when no court will be involved. The same clause also provides that when the child is placed for adoption (whether under a placement order or by consent) the prospective adopters acquire parental responsibility. Again, this involves the granting of parental responsibility without reference to a court. 
 While the child is placed for adoption, parental responsibility will be shared by the agency, the parents and the prospective adopters but clause 24(4) gives the agency an unqualified power (subject only to the requirements of clause 1) to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility by both the parents and the prospective adopters. This contrasts with the position under the Children Act, where a local authority that has parental responsibility by virtue of a care order may determine the extent to which a parent or guardian may meet his or her parental responsibility for a child, but may not exercise this power unless they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in order to safeguard or promote the child's welfare. 
 When a placement order is made by a court, it is appropriate that parental responsibility should be given to the local authority concerned, but there is no reason why the wording of the Children Act (s.33(3) and (4)) should not apply in this situation exactly as it does under a care order. Where an agency is authorised to place a child for adoption with the consent of the parents, there is no need for parental responsibility to be vested in the agency; the situation is comparable to the placing of a child in accommodation under s.20 of the Children Act; the parent can of course, as would usually happen now, authorise the local authority—or the prospective adopters—to exercise certain aspects of parental responsibility such as consent to medical treatment. 
 These provisions regarding parental responsibility are even more inappropriate when it is seen that the combined effect of clauses 18(4) and 24(1) are to continue to vest parental responsibility in an adoption agency and in the prospective adopters where the child was placed for adoption by consent, but the consent is subsequently withdrawn.

c) Decision to apply for placement order

Clause 21 of the Bill sets out the circumstances in which a local authority must or may apply for a placement order. The circumstances under clause 21(1) are those where the child has been voluntarily accommodated by the local authority, or placed for adoption by agreement. The local authority must apply for a placement order if they consider that the child should be adopted, and that the conditions for a care order under s.31(2) of the Children Act are satisfied, and they are not ``authorised'' to place the child for adoption—i.e. that the consent of one or more parent or guardian to placement for adoption is not, or is no longer, forthcoming. This in itself is quite appropriate, but, by virtue of clause 29(2), as soon as the local authority falls under the duty to apply for a placement order (i.e.—presumably—as soon as they are satisfied that the conditions under clause 21(1) exist, no one, including the child's parents may remove the child from the local authority accommodation without the leave of the court. This contrasts with the position under the Children Act where a local authority faced with a parent's desire to remove a child from accommodation when they think this will put the child at risk must apply for an emergency protection order. In this situation the onus is on the local authority to apply to the court to protect the child; under the Bill the onus is placed on the parent to apply to the court if they wish to have the child returned. This is reminiscent of the old ``parental rights'' resolutions prior to the Children Act, which were condemned by the European Court of Human Rights and the House of Commons Select Committee Report on children in care in 1984.

d) Foster Carers

Clause 41 provides that foster carers who seek to adopt need to have had the child living with them for at least a year before making the application—but this condition may be waived if the court gives leave. By contrast, s.9 of the Children Act, even as amended by this Bill (clause 108), provides that foster carers may, with the leave of the court, apply for a residence order if the child has lived with them for one year—but they cannot even apply to the court for leave to make such an application within a shorter period unless the local authority agrees. By the provisions of clause 110 of this Bill, the same conditions apply to applications by local authority foster parents for special guardianship orders as to applications for residence orders. There clearly needs to be a consistent approach. Since the need to apply for the court's leave should provide sufficient restraint on unsuitable applications, it is suggested that the consent of the local authority to an application for leave under s.9(3) of the Children Act should be removed. This would provide the same framework for application for residence, special guardianship and adoption orders.

Memorandum from the Association of the Directors of Social Services - 1. INTRODUCTION

Members of the Association of Directors of Social Services (ADSS) warmly welcome the Adoption and Children Bill and the changes that have been made since the Bill was previously introduced to Parliament on 15 March 2001 in response to evidence submitted to the Select Committee at that time. 
 At present in England and Wales more children from public are placed for adoption than any other European country. There has been a significant increase in the number of children adopted from care, 3,067 in the year ending 31 March 2001, in comparison with 2,700 the previous year. This represents a 12% increase from the year ending 31 March 2000 and a 40% increase from the year ending 31 March 1999. 
 Considerable progress is also being made in attempts to reduce the length of time children are looked after before an adoption order is made: for the year ending 31 March 2001 this period was on average 2 years 9 months, down from 2 years 10 months the previous year. 
 This progress is particularly welcome in the light of the continuing complexity of placing such damaged children with adoptive families. 
 There is a need for intensive preparation and care in placing children for adoption today, given the relatively few children who are relinquished for adoption, and that the majority have endured very damaging experiences which are likely to have life long implications for them and their families. It is also important to recognise that the adoption process must go at the child's pace; for older children it may take many months to prepare them for adoption, a process which cannot begin in earnest until after the outcome of care proceedings.

2. ADOPTION SUPPORT FRAMEWORK

The Association welcomes the extension of entitlement to adoption support services for those who may be or have been adopted, birth parents and adoptive parents. The Association regards the development of adoption support services as an important major initiative. We note that the new provisions are retrospective, and recognise that people do not necessarily seek help immediately after the making of an adoption order, and that their need may arise several years later. However the financial consequences of these provisions have to be faced so that we can ensure that adoptive parents, birth parents and children get the support they need whether it be from health, education, or the 24 hour response that has proved so successful in the fostering world.

3. ADOPTION BY MARRIED COUPLES OR SINGLE PEOPLE

The Association would respectfully recommend that further consideration is given to enable unmarried couples to make a joint legal commitment to a child through adoption.

4. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ABOUT A PERSON'S ADOPTION

The Association recognises the extraordinarily difficult task of finding a balance between the rights of birth parents who request that identifying information is withheld from their adopted child, and the need of an adopted person to obtain further information. There are a small number of cases where a member of the birth family may be at significant risk if that information were disclosed because an adopted person expresses a wish to seek revenge for early abuse suffered at the hands of birth parents. There are also a few cases where the adopted person may place themselves at risk by attempting to trace their birth parent(s). It is fully acknowledged that these examples are both extreme and few in number. However it is important to recognise that the majority of children now being placed for adoption come through the court arena, many of whom have been physically, emotionally or sexually abused or neglected, or a combination of all of these factors, which suggests that the potential for similar extreme examples is likely to increase in the future. 
 It is also important to recognise the ease with which individuals are now able to trace birth families via the Internet, an increasing number of whom are seeking to do so without the benefit of counselling. 
 The new provisions enable every individual involved in a person's adoption the right to express their wishes about the sensitivity of information that identifies them, yet gives adoption agencies the discretion in exceptional circumstances to determine whether to override a decision to withhold or disclose identifying information. 
 In the vast majority of adoptions taking place very successful arrangements are made for the exchange of information between adoptive and birth parents as the child grows up. Yet it is for the minority of more problematic cases where safeguards need to be in place. On balance we would support the new proposals.

5. INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION

The Association welcomes tighter controls on intercountry adoption and tougher penalties on those seeking to circumvent proper procedures. Very careful consideration needs to be given as to which countries' adoptions will be brought within the definition of clause 83, bearing in mind the experience accumulated in respect of intercountry adoptions over the past decade.

6. REGISTRATION OF PRIVATE FOSTERING

The Association believes that no opportunity should be lost to protect this particularly vulnerable group of children. In recognition of some recent high profile cases, we would respectfully suggest that there is a need to put in place legislation for the registration of private foster carers. Privately fostered children can be amongst the most vulnerable children in society, without adequate regulation, and separated from their families and often living in a different culture. At the least we would support the establishment of a local authority held register of properly approved private foster parents but believe that the Committee should consider whether legislation should be amended to reflect a category of looked after children whose parents are unable to care for them for a specific reason.

7. RESOURCES

The Association respectfully suggests that there are very significant financial implications for local authorities in trying to comply with the requirements and expectations contained within this Bill. Local authorities will not be in a position to meet these requirements unless sufficient funding is provided by Central Government. In addition local authorities are all faced with a serious shortfall of trained social workers to undertake the work which is expected of us. 
 Rob Hutchinson 
 Chair of ADSS Children & Families Committee

Memorandum from the Local Government Association

INTRODUCTION 
 This briefing outlines the key issues for local government in the adoption and children bill. The bill sets out a range of proposals to improve the adoption service, which will continue to be provided by local authorities, making the welfare of the child paramount and avoiding delay. It builds upon measures set out in the white paper Adoption—a new approach and in the Bill introduced in the last session. 
 As the national voice for local communities, the LGA speaks for nearly 500 local authorities, representing over 50 million people and spending £65 billion a year on local services. The LGA has been established to promote the case for democratic local communities which are prosperous, safe, healthy and environmentally sustainable, and which provide equality of opportunity for all. 
 Social services authorities provide adoption and permanence services in accordance with the Adoption Act 1976 and the Children Act 1989. The LGA welcomes the Adoption and Children Bill and is committed to improving the quality of life for children and young people for whom adoption is the best plan. Local authorities have a key role in finding permanent families for children who cannot live with their birth families. Local authorities also provide services to step parents wishing to adopt, and to those adopting from abroad. Local authorities are increasing the proportion of looked after children adopted—from 2,000 to 2,700 in 1999-2000. Local authorities with Public Service Agreements have set themselves stretching targets to achieve on adoption. 
 It is vital that the new duties for local government are adequately resourced, and that targets and standards are realistic and achievable. Much of the detail will be left to regulation and guidance e.g. adoption allowances. These are not simply technical matters and we seek assurances that there will be proper time for consultation.

CHANGES FROM THE EARLIER BILL

—stronger measures to stop people wishing to adopt from overseas from avoiding the proper assessment and approval procedures, plus tougher penalties if they attempt to get around the safeguards. The measures extend to include children who have been adopted overseas. 
 —more improvements to adoption support services, available to a wider group of people, including birth parents, with a new registration system to ensure quality 
 —changes to the placement order provisions to ensure the Bill is closely aligned with the Children Act 
 —opening adoption support services up to a wider range of providers, who don't have to be adoption agencies 
 —a new more consistent approach on access to information held in adoption agency records to ensure that the release of this sensitive information about adopted people and birth families takes account of their views wherever possible. 
 —a duty for local councils to make adoption support services available for special guardians 
 Other key provisions in the Bill include: 
 —changing the law to ensure the needs of children are at the heart of the adoption process 
 —giving all adoptive families a new right to an assessment for adoption support 
 —placing a clear duty on local authorities in England and Wales to maintain an adoption support service 
 —establishing a new independent review mechanism for prospective adopters who feel they have been turned down unfairly 
 —legally underpinning the new Adoption Register for England and Wales to enable faster matches 
 —allowing courts to set timetables to cut delays in adoption court cases. 
 —introducing a more straightforward process for step-parents to acquire parental responsibility either through courts or with consent 
 —introducing a new special guardianship order to provide security and permanence for children where adoption is not suitable 
 —providing adopted people with consistent access to information about the background to their adoption

KEY ISSUES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT - Clause 1 Family Support and balance of rights

Clause 1 (4) (a) refers to having regard to the wishes and feelings of the child. Children should have the right to consent to adoption and to be made a party to the proceedings. The value of contingency, concurrent and parallel planning should be recognised in the Bill and in the adoption standards. (See attached example.) There are real concerns about targets which may rush agencies into placing children for adoption when the best plan, in accordance with the wishes of the child, may be to work with the birth family to enable them to care for their child. The Government's target is to increase by 40% (preferably by 50%) the number of looked after children adopted and in legally secure placements. The objective is families for life but failed adoption is a catastrophic disaster for the child, which will scar for life. 
 There should be a clear link to case law under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act. A higher threshold should be applied to removing a child from its birth family to be adopted than for the making of a care order. There must also be safeguards for children where contact with a violent parent is a serious child protection issue. The LGA also seeks good access to courts for families.

Clause 3 Maintenance of adoption services

Responsibilities of local authorities in providing a comprehensive adoption service are clarified.

Clause 4 A new duty to assess for and provide adoption support services

The bill sets out a right for all adoptive families to be assessed for adoption support. We are pleased that the earlier Bill has been amended to recognise the need for pre as well as post adoption support. Adopters know what they want and expect support and joined up services, not just an assessment. All social services authorities will be expected to provide support, including financial support, planned jointly with local education authorities and the NHS. The duty to review the child's plan and provide post adoption services continues after the child reaches 18 years. There will also be demand for LAs to give financial and other support for children who are and who have been the subject of the new special guardianship orders (Clause 94). Adoption support services are defined at clause 2 (6) as (a) counselling, advice and information in connection with adoption and (b) such other services as are specified in regulations (which may include financial support). There should be a direct reference to adoption allowances. Support is vital in promoting successful placements and preventing adoption breakdown and should encourage more potential adopters. However, the LGA is keen to ensure that there is adequate additional funding, particularly for adoption allowances.

Support from health, education and housing services

Clause 4(9) provides that a local authority which carries out an assessment and finds that there may be a need for provision of services by a health authority or local education authority, is required to notify the relevant authority. It is important that there be a duty on health and education authorities to comply with the request for services, perhaps in the context of the new National Service Framework for children. There should be specific reference to child and adolescent mental health services. Issues where adopted children are placed in different health and education authority areas from the originating and responsible social services authority need to be addressed. Children should not go to the bottom of a waiting list for health support and medical treatment as a result of moving from one health area to another. There will also be needs for assistance with housing and accommodation. It is essential that responsibilities and funding for supporting education and meeting special educational needs at all stages are clarified, especially post 16 and the role of Learning and Skills Councils. 
 We welcome the clarification of the duty of local authorities to provide services to birth parents, and their power to give support also to other birth family members, although there needs to be new funding for these services. Should this service extend to the provision of intermediary services to birth family members who are hoping to establish some contact with the adopted (adult) person? The Department of Health recently issued guidance to adoption agencies on the provision of such services, and we would welcome a commitment to put such guidance on a statutory footing.

Clause 12 Independent review mechanism

Provision of a review mechanism for potential adopters who feel that they have been turned down unfairly is supported. Adoption agencies should be consulted on the proposals for regulations. Funding must be available for agencies to meet costs incurred.

Clauses 17 to 28 Provisions for Placement for Adoption and Placement Orders

The introduction of placement orders to replace the current 'freeing for adoption' provisions is welcomed. These provisions are extremely complex and, although they have been improved since the earlier Bill, will need to be the subject of further consideration and consultation. 
 There should be consistency with the provisions of the Children Act on the vesting of parental responsibility, the rights of parents to remove the child from accommodation and applications by foster carers for adoption orders, residence orders or special guardianship orders. Why does the Bill provide that where a child is ``authorised'' to be placed for adoption by a local authority, the child is to be treated as looked after by the local authority, even if he/she is not?

Clause 47 Adoption by Married Couples or Single People

We ask the Government to consider allowing two adults in a stable long term relationship to adopt a child jointly. It is now estimated that 40% of children are born outside marriage, with many adults living in committed relationships but not in marriage. If joint adoption is restricted to married adults, the opportunity for children to find adoptive parents is reduced—there is already a shortage of adopters for many groups of children. Unmarried couples are deterred form adopting because they cannot apply jointly. Public opinion is in favour of change. BAAF commissioned a Mori Survey in September 2001, which showed that 68% of respondents supported joint adoption by unmarried couples in stable long-term relationships. The issue is not about equality for adults but about the need for children to have the lifelong legal relationship with those adults whom they regard as their parents. The Bill does provide that two adults living together may apply jointly for a special guardianship order but the lifelong security of an adoption order may be preferred.

Clauses 53 to 62

The clauses in the Bill relating to the sharing of information are extremely complex and require clarification. Clause 54(6) provides for information to be shared where agreement is reached. We hope that there will be an opportunity for birth parents to change their minds, where they have originally not wished to pass on information, and let the agency know that they are willing for information to be passed on. Agencies receive many health inquiries from adoptees. Unfortunately the proposals make the process worse for adopted adults as clause 55(5) of the 1976 Act will be repealed. The adoption agency will be the intermediary between adoptees and their birth families. We are not happy with the proposal that the adopted child would have to go to the adoption agency for their birth certificate instead of having direct access. The child should be treated as a child of the adoptive family but without pretending that they had not been born to another family. We recommend that the right of adopted adults to have access to their birth certificates should be retained. 
 We welcome the clarification of the duty of local authorities to provide services to birth parents, and their power to give support also to other birth family members, but there is nothing in the Bill indicating whether this service should extend to the provision of intermediary services to birth family members who are hoping to establish some contact with the adopted (adult) person. The Department of Health recently issued guidance to adoption agencies on the provision of such services, and we would welcome a commitment to put such guidance on a statutory footing.

Clauses 80 to 87

Sections 9 and 14 of the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999 came into force on 30 April 2001, placing a duty on councils to establish and maintain a service that covers both domestic and intercountry adoption. It is not clear what funding has been made available to cover these new duties. We fully agree that children should not be bought and sold and that there must be scrutiny of placements. (Clause 91)

Clause 115 Adoption and Children Register

The bill sets out measures to establish a national adoption register, which will hold details of all children waiting to be adopted and all approved adoptive families. The LGA supports measures which will help placement at the pace of the child. It is important to ensure that the national register works in tandem with local adoption consortia of local authorities and voluntary agencies. The consortia have the advantage of offering children local placements, which can mean stability and the maintenance of contact with family and friends and schooling. The LGA is pleased that there will be opportunities for local adoption before placement out of area. Requirements of the Human Rights Act and race relations legislation should be met. The high cost of inter-agency fees can be a barrier, particularly to smaller LAs in recruiting adoptive families to meet children's needs from voluntary agencies or other LAs. Such deterrents must be addressed. A mis-match is expected between children awaiting adoption and prospective adoptive families. Adoption agencies should be allowed to prioritise assessment for prospective adopters who are likely to meet the needs of the children who are waiting, especially harder to place children such as large sibling groups and those with severe disabilities and behavioural difficulties.

Registration of Private Foster Carers

We recommend implementation of the recommendation in Sir William Utting's Report concerning private foster children. This would require the local authority to maintain a register of approved private foster carers and make it an offence for a parent to place a child with foster carers who were not approved, or for carers not on the register to foster children. The Victoria Climbie tragedy highlights the need for control of private foster carers.

Funding

While we are pleased that adoption legislation is being brought up to date, thorough assessment will be need to be made of the funding requirements of the new adoption allowances, long-term and specialist support, additional support for new parents and birth families, recruitment and training of additional adoption workers and improved services and standards. There are over 4,000 adoptions a year nationally, including stepparent. Adoption services, especially adoption support, have been underfunded. The necessary investment was not made with the Adoption Act 1976 or the Children Act 1989. Implementation of the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999 should also be funded. It is very disappointing that the Government announced £66.5m over three years to secure sustained improvements in adoption services is not new money but had already been announced as part of the Quality Protects programme. Most authorities had already allocated the Quality Protects children's services special grant. New targets and standards should be realistic and achievable and be matched with resources. There are new duties in this Bill which must be funded with new money in additional to any hypothetical amounts in the Quality Protects programme.

EXAMPLE OF CONCURRENT PLANNING: BURY METROPOLITAN BOROUGH COUNCIL

There has been a long-standing partnership between Bury children's services and Manchester Adoption Society (MAS). MAS is piloting concurrent planning in England, with Bury as one of the local authority partners. The project began in 1998 and is being evaluated by the Thomas Coram Foundation. The Goodman Project builds on North American practice and recruits carers who can undertake both fostering and adoption tasks. 
 Children are selected for the Project in situations where there has been a great deal of social services involvement and major concerns about parents' abilities to meet children's needs. Children are assessed with the possibility of an adoption plan if rehabilitation fails. This has been effective in reducing the number of placements for children who go through this process. The involvement of senior members of the judiciary has been instrumental in improving outcomes for children. If parents are not able to improve their ability to meet the child's needs, plans are made concurrently for children to remain permanently with their foster carers. If rehabilitation is not assessed as feasible within the appropriate timescale for the child, the plan is made for adoption and the role of the carers changes. 
 In the first year, Bury has used the Project for babies who have gone into adoption planning without having to have a change of placement. A new group of carers has been recruited and Bury looks forward to using the service for more children.

Further information

If you require further information please contact Dorothy Blatcher on 020 7664 3338 or email Dorothy.Blatcher@lga.gov.uk 
 Felicity Collier, Chief Executive, British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering; Deborah Cullen, Legal Group Secretary, British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering; Moira Gibb, Director of Social Services, Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea; Meg Staples, Adoption Manager, Nottinghamshire county council; Councillor Maureen Rutter, Chair of the Local Government Association, Children Task Group and Mr. Andrew Christie, Assistant Director, London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, called in and examined.

David Hinchliffe: I welcome all the witnesses to the Committee.

Jonathan R Shaw: Can I ask in what way the provisions in the Bill relating to placement orders and parental consent need to be amended?

Deborah Cullen (British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering): It seems to be me who has got the short straw on this one. Basically, as far as placement orders are concerned, we are pleased with the way the Bill has changed from the one that was presented in March, in that it has now provided that a placement order cannot be made unless the child is already subject to a care order, or the threshold conditions for a care order are met. We think that that is certainly a big improvement.
 The provisions about placement and placement orders are extremely complicated. Even with the help of the flowchart and the explanatory notes, one needs a cold towel around the head to work it all out. One of the difficulties is that it is not clear how the provisions about placement, and to some extent the placement order provisions, dovetail with the Children Act 1989. If I can give one example, under the Children Act, a local authority has a duty under section 20 to provide accommodation for a child whose welfare requires it, and whose parent is prevented from looking after the child themselves. That may be for a whole variety of reasons; it may be very short term or it may be longer term. 
 Under the Bill, if a parent actually wishes to have their child adopted, clause 18 provides that if the parents consent to adoption, the local authority is authorised to place the child for adoption, and it is not exactly clear how that ties in with the provision about the accommodation of a child under the Children Act. In particular, restrictions are then placed on the ability of the parent to change his or her mind and remove the child from the accommodation in which the local authority placed them, even if the child has not yet been placed for adoption. 
 For example, if a single mother were to approach the local authority and say that she wished her child to be adopted, and it was satisfied that she really meant that and it should go ahead, it is very likely that, in the short term, the authority would place the child with a foster carer while it made arrangements for the adoption. If she subsequently changed her mind, even before the child had been placed, the Bill provides that she cannot immediately get the child back. She can notify the local authority of her change of mind, and the authority then has as long as 14 days to return the child. If she takes the child without its authority, she could be guilty of a criminal offence. 
 That seems a very draconian contrast with the provisions in the Children Act concerning the accommodation of the child. Under the provisions, if the parent decides that he or she wished to withdraw the child from accommodation, they have the right to do so. If the local authority considers that that is against the interests of the child and the child would be at risk, it has, of course, the option of applying for an emergency protection order. There seems no reason under the framework of this Bill, why that should not be the recourse that the authority would have if it thought that the child would be at risk of returning. 
 You also asked about consent to adoption and consent to placement orders on the grounds that to dispense with consent—

David Hinchliffe: Briefly, Ms. Cullen. We know that you are a lawyer.

Deborah Cullen: I am sorry. We set out fairly clearly in our written evidence why we think that the Bill does not make sufficient distinction between those cases in which a parent agrees to adoption and those in which the parent does not agree. In effect, the test would be the same in either case. The court is certainly required to take account of the wishes and views of the parent, but there is nothing special about what the court has to do if it is actually going to override the parent's disagreement to adoption.

Meg Munn: Specifically on that point, I understand that BAAF favoured the form of words suggested by the adoption law review team, which was about adoption being ``so significantly better'' for a child than any other option. Were you not reassured—I assume you were in the room, although I am not sure—by what the Department of Health said about clause 1(4), which sets out the whole range of issues that must be taken into account?

Deborah Cullen: In a way that is reassuring, and I have had similar conversations with the Department of Health already on the subject. In practical terms, I think that the number of cases that would go one way rather than another if a different form of words were used is probably very small. But if you actually put in the Bill that a parent's consent is required for adoption unless it can be dispensed with, and then do not make any distinction between cases in which the parent consents and those in which he or she does not, I am not absolutely sure that that is an appropriate approach. In practical terms, it will probably not make a huge amount of difference.

Meg Munn: On that point, is there not a danger that lawyers could spend a lot of time arguing over what ``significantly'' means?

Deborah Cullen: I think that they could spend a lot of time arguing anyway.

Tim Loughton: Can we talk about support services and, in particular, address questions to the representatives of the Association of Directors of Social Services and of the Local Government Association? Obviously, a lot more responsibilities and activities will be placed on local authorities; we have heard about assessments being a requirement, followed up by support services. What are your thoughts on the resourcing requirements of those? Will assessments delay the putting into effect of the support services that are deemed to be required later? If someone is in need of help, they are in need of help now; they are not in need of booking an appointment for an assessment that will tell somebody that they are in need of help, and perhaps getting that help a few months later. Practically, what will be the impact of this, and how prepared are you for it?

Moira Gibb (Director of Social Services, Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea): It seems to me absolutely vital that the Bill, when it becomes an Act, is supported with proper resources. The history of adoption legislation is not one that would give us great cause to have that faith. It will be extremely difficult if the expectations of those involved in adoption are raised, only to be dashed because they have received only an assessment and a service is not made available. The fact that they have come forward for an assessment means that they believe that they have a need for help, but obviously, local authorities and their children's services are struggling at the moment, and it will be impossible. Unless the Government make resources available to support the legislation, it seems to me that they will end up fighting very hard against the clear trend of more children being looked after for longer periods and in more costly ways, in terms of the increase in the number of care orders.
 What we will be able to provide will depend totally on the resources that are made available. The sense in the field, I have to say, is that the resources that have been announced are not new resources, because we knew about them already. Therefore, people already feel that there is sleight of hand in the approach to this. We feel very strongly that it is really wrong to expect an improvement in the service unless the resources are made available. It is vital that adoption remains part of children's services as a whole and not simply a service on its own. It is clear that we need to improve children's services planning in order to improve adoption services. We cannot steal money out of one bit of social services to resource the adoption service; it will not make sense for children if we keep doing that.

Tim Loughton: I think the Minister is listening.
 Do you think that there should be a statutory duty to provide an assessment? Do you think that there are circumstances under which you should refuse an assessment? If there is to be an assessment, should there be some time limit on when it should be brought in and, if necessary, followed by the support services?

Moira Gibb: It seems to be right that we should have a duty to provide an assessment. Obviously, we are talking about individuals who are parenting children on behalf of the state—on behalf of the rest of us—so if they need help in doing that, it is right that that help is available. It has to be a gateway to services, and we do not want to have an expensive, defensive assessment system that is merely designed to upset and disappoint.

Tim Loughton: In terms of consistency of approach among authorities around the country, is there an enormous gap between good practice and not-so-good practice? What is happening to disseminate best practice to those authorities that are under-performing; indeed, how does one judge that they are under-performing? As a rider to that, on Second Reading we talked about raising the levels in terms of the numbers of adoptions. That begs the question whether there will be targets for local authorities. If so, how will they respond to having targets, or raw numbers, imposed on them?

Moira Gibb: There are a number of points in that. It is very clear that there is varying practice in adoption work, as in all aspects of social services, but what we are seeing is a general trend of improvement. I think that the adoption taskforce was greatly welcomed by my colleagues in terms of the approach that it took towards spreading good practice and in recognising that even in the less well performing authorities there was good practice that could be shared with others.
 Again, it is very important that targets do not drive the wrong kind of behaviour. We are all only human and we all want to be part of a well performing service, so we do not want short cuts that simply meet our targets but do not serve the interests of children. Therefore, it is very important that targets in this area are clear and understood and not created simply to meet an ambitious national target; they must be relevant to children locally. It is just as worrying that there are variations in other practices, as in relation to placement for adoption. We need help nationally to support the improvements and to spread best practice.

Tim Loughton: Finally, is there any trend of poorer performance? Does it relate to more deprived areas, such as inner-city areas, where the statistics tend not to be so impressive, or is that not a leader at all and you judge performance on completely different factors?

Moira Gibb: The Children Act report acknowledged recently that the better-resourced departments were likely to be better performing, although the joint reviews have consistently attempted to disprove this theory. While it is not true that well-resourced authorities are always better performers, that correlation is now established. Authorities that are stretched in other areas are going to find it very difficult to put into practice the development that is required to bring about improvements.

Liz Blackman: I was going to ask a question, but the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham has just asked it.

David Hinchliffe: Can we move on to disclosure of information? Sticking with you, Ms Gibb, you probably heard us discuss this point in the earlier session. Your organisation clearly supports the Bill's provisions in respect of disclosure of information. You are probably aware of the criticism of that position; how do you defend your corner?

Moira Gibb: I am going to retreat from my corner—[Interruption].

David Hinchliffe: I was asking Ms Gibb. I shall come to you in a moment, Miss Collier. I know that you were up very early this morning.

Moira Gibb: I am not going to defend our corner; I wish to retreat from it and to say that we have had further information that we would like to consider. We recognise the very strong concerns that exist. Obviously, we recognise the small number of individual cases that give rise to concern, but we acknowledge the point that others have made to us about the very strong message about the rights of children and the needs of children coming first in adoption, which is very much part of our approach. If you wanted to accuse us of being confused, we would probably acknowledge that, but the matter is so significant and important that we would want to withdraw that part of our evidence and say that our position is undetermined.

David Hinchliffe: I welcome your frankness. You are reconsidering the initial position; that is helpful.

Kevin Brennan: I welcome that, too. In the evidence given this morning, we were given the extreme example of a case of an individual who was abused in childhood and then sought out their birth parent with murderous intent. It seems completely illogical that an individual who had been abused but had not been adopted would presumably have the right to know who their abuser was, but someone who had been adopted would not have the right to know. Where is the logic and justice in that? I was going to put that question to you in light of your evidence, but since you are withdrawing it, you have rather removed the need. Should not the fundamental human right of people to know as much as possible about their origins should outweigh all other considerations? Should not other mechanisms deal with threats to the physical safety of parents?

Moira Gibb: Again, clearly, we are talking about a service to children and meeting children's needs, which should always be at the forefront of our thinking. Adoption as a service is only achieved by adults who are prepared to come forward and do it, so therefore people have obviously listened. I am not defending our previous position. I am just explaining again that there is a view that says if you do not make it safe and secure for adults to come forward to undertake this difficult task and reassure them, it will make it less likely that we will be successful in our targets. I recognise the fundamental point at the core of this.

Kevin Brennan: Just to finish the point, I appreciate that clause 1(2) is at the heart of the Bill and that the paramount consideration should be the child's welfare throughout his life. I know that, in that initial sense, that refers only to the adoption decision, but is it not logical that the continuum of adoption beyond childhood should also be a consideration?

Moira Gibb: Yes.

David Hinchliffe: Miss Collier, would you like to come in on that point?

Felicity Collier (Chief Executive, British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering): I do, because, as I am sure you are aware, we feel very strongly about withdrawing a fundamental right to which adopted adults have known that they have had access—to their birth certificates and, therefore, their identity—since 1976. It is very important because one cannot put one's name on the adoption contact register to trace one's brothers and sisters, whom one is aware exist, unless one has access to one's original name. That is valued so greatly by so many adopted adults that we think that to lightly withdraw it would cause enormous distress.
 We know that this is expected to be a future rather than a retrospective measure, but we would say that there is significant and emerging research evidence about one of the points that Mr. Paton made in relation to the wishes of birth parents. Indeed, there is evidence that I know you will hear from an academic researcher tomorrow—John Triseliotis—who is happy for me to refer to it. The evidence says that of a sample of birth parents who were contacted by their adopted adult children, no less than 94 per cent. were either positive or very positive about the fact that that had happened. Although about 20 per cent. of birth parents initially express some concerns and nervousness—clearly, there are issues for them in relation to this—the overwhelming view is that this is something that has been with them probably throughout their lives. The feelings around relinquishing your child, or losing your child through contested court hearings, are so fundamental, that such parents often harbour a wish to be discovered at some point. 
 Basically, this is a right of adopted adults and we take the point made over here that there are many thousands of children on care orders who have been horrendously abused and neglected. Those children have the right to know their identity. Some of them may or may not seek out their birth parents with a feeling of revenge, but there is no evidence to suggest that that is a major problem. For adopted adults it will be a much smaller problem. We are talking about withdrawing a right to protect a tiny minority. 
 We support the fact that, as a general rule, access to birth records should be through adoption agencies and local authorities, rather than through the Registrar-General. That puts in a safety clause. If there are very difficult issues about the circumstances of a person's adoption, he or she can be offered counselling and support. However, we hope that you will reject this change.

Jacqui Smith: If, as you have rightly said, the only source of information should be through an adoption agency, what is your view about the fact that it would be possible to sidetrack that route to get direct access to a birth certificate without protection being available?

Felicity Collier: It is not available currently because only adults who were adopted before 1976 have to receive counselling. The difference now is—I am trying to think laterally about this—if you approach an adoption agency rather than the Registrar-General, the adoption agency, in looking out for that birth certificate and information, will take the opportunity to flag up whether there were earlier concerns, and possibly take appropriate safeguards or alert the person. I am not quite sure how that will work. I wonder whether my colleague takes a view on that?

Deborah Cullen: I would have thought that that could be built into the many regulations that there will be under those particular sections. We were told earlier that there was going to be consultation about what form of intermediary services would be offered, and that would obviously be an area where, if it were known that an adopted adult was seeking information, the agency could have a duty to make the initial contact with the birth relative—if it were able to find them—so it would not come as a shock to that person.

Felicity Collier: Given the point made earlier about the changing nature of adoption—far more children who have had very troubled early beginnings are now adopted—it may be right to build in some safeguard for an intermediary service to be available. That would make sense.

Jacqui Smith: Right. So what you are saying is that you would not accept a situation in which the only access to identifying information about birth parents would be through an adoption agency. Would you still argue that there need to be other routes that are unmediated in the way in which you have just described?

Deborah Cullen: I was anticipating your question and wrongly second-guessing you. The Bill provides for access to both more general information, which should be through the agency, and the birth certificate, which is now obtained from the Registrar-General. We see no objection to that; indeed, we see some positive benefits. We would not want to say that a person seeking that information has to be the compulsory recipient of counselling or should be prevented from choosing, if he or she so wishes, to make a direct approach to the birth parent. I do not think that it would be right to prohibit that, but the agency would obviously be in a position to take a proactive approach and say, ``We have the information. We suggest that you take the opportunity to talk this through, and if you want to make an approach to your birth parent, allow us to make the initial approach so that they have time to absorb the information and think about it.''

Jacqui Smith: Could you never envisage a situation in which a birth parent might have the right not to be identified?

Deborah Cullen: No, I think it goes the other way.

Jacqui Smith: I did not ask the question the other way. Could you never envisage a situation in which a birth parent might have the right not to be identified?

Felicity Collier: No, we could not. One issue that concerns me, and I do not know whether it is part of the Government's thinking, is that it could be thought—I think erroneously—that more failing and disadvantaged birth parents would relinquish their children for adoption if they felt that there was no opportunity to be found later in life. I do not think—I am not suggesting that that is necessarily the point that you are taking, but it is a possible interpretation—that that is a feasible situation. That would reproduce the fiction of 30 or 40 years ago, when one thought that by relinquishing one's child, it was as though that child had never existed. We do not think that that is helpful.

Jacqui Smith: I agree, but could you never envisage a situation in which there might be a right for a birth parent? You think that there is an absolute right in every circumstance for a child or adopted adult to have identifying information about their birth parents.

Felicity Collier: That is the current situation. Like all these situations, one may be able to imagine an individual case that would suggest extreme difficulty, but we do not think that good law is made on the basis of one individual case.

Andrew Love: I have been reading the submission of the Association of Directors of Social Services and I apologise to Ms Gibb if my referring to it proves slightly embarrassing under the circumstances. My question relates to the following sentence:
``However it is important to recognise that the majority of children now being placed for adoption come through the court arena, many of whom have been physically, emotionally or sexually abused or neglected, or a combination of all of these factors, which suggests that the potential for similar extreme examples is likely to increase in the future.'' 
Do members of the panel other than representatives of the British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering—it is perhaps not appropriate to ask this of them in the light of their earlier answer—think an increase in such cases will be a factor? If so, how do we deal with the small number of cases where that major problem is likely to arise?

Moira Gibb: It is obviously true, as has been said, that adoption is a very different service from the one that I think the general public still carry around in their heads. It is a service to separated children and many, many more adoptions are subject to disputes. I think that what the Government are trying to achieve in this exercise and other work around the policy is to improve the planning for children so that the disadvantages that they face early in life are improved upon and their initial disadvantages are not compounded by poor care when they become looked after. What we are trying to achieve is early settlement and a permanent bond for them to be able to achieve. However, I think that it is fair to say that, because we are successful also in rehabilitating children with their families, the children that we do separate often come from very complex and difficult backgrounds.

Andrew Love: But you accept that that is an increasing problem.

Moira Gibb: Yes, I do, but that is not to say that it would necessarily contribute, therefore, to the more extreme cases. Again, the whole principle of openness is just so much more accepted now, and it underlines all our thinking in relation to adoption, but that is a push in the opposite direction.

David Hinchliffe: Councillor Rutter, do you have a view on this area?

Maureen Rutter: I was asked whether I think that such a situation is liable to increase because there appears to be some sort of evidence at the moment that it is increasing, and whether they will be likely to be coming from abusive situations or neglectful situations.
 It is true that this particular type of situation has increased. There is no doubt about that, but I do not think that we know why. I have asked whether we have research to show why, but there just does not seem to be any. On the face of it—

Andrew Love: I am sorry to interrupt, but there is always a time constraint. I do not think that the Committee is looking for those answers, so the question is, if the situation is increasing, should we recognise that that may well be a factor in the disclosure of information in a small number of cases?

Maureen Rutter: I do not think so, I have to say. At the end of the day, it is a fundamental and very important right for every person to know about their origins. With a different hat on—I have done a lot of work in counselling, as against councilloring—it seemed to me to be so important to every single person that I came across to know about their birth, their antecedents and so on. I honestly think that this is something that should not be taken away.

Meg Munn: Moving on to intercountry adoption, there seems to be general support for the tightening up that is envisaged in the Bill. However, I want to ask a specific question about agencies, particularly voluntary adoption agencies, that approve the adoption of people from other countries. Do you have a view on whether they should supervise subsequent placements, or would it be preferable for them to be supervised by the local authority in the area in which they live?

Deborah Cullen: This is a topic on which the Government are currently consulting in respect of the proposed regulations and guidance in connection with implementing the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999 and The Hague convention. With a different hat on, I am a trustee of a small voluntary adoption agency that has in the past undertaken intercountry adoption assessments, and something that exercises us very much is whether the agency would be in a position to supervise the follow-up when the child is actually placed with the prospective adopters, and how that would be financed.
 It is a difficult issue. What appears to be proposed under the draft regulations is that it should remain, as it is now, a local authority responsibility. I can see the advantages of that. On the other hand, from the point of view of the prospective adopters themselves, I can see disadvantages because they will have got to know the agency and the assessing social worker during the period of assessment, and then suddenly they have to chop over to a new arrangement, so I think that there are disadvantages. Because that consultation has only just been issued, we have not actually had time to consult and form a view.

Moira Gibb: Our view is that, anyway, local authorities are more and more commissioners of services and do not necessarily provide them directly. They wish to see variety, particularly in the area of adoption, in sharing and setting up consortiums and perhaps commissioning work from independent agencies. The important thing is that, whoever does it, the agency is set up to have the capacity to do that as well as any assessment.

David Hinchliffe: We come now to the issue of unmarried couples adopting.

Julian Brazier: I should like to ask Felicity Collier about the survey that she has kindly enclosed in her submission.
 I find myself in agreement with your last remarks that a few hard cases should not cause us to change a situation that has worked very well for 30 years. I am a little puzzled, however, as to what your polling material is supposed to suggest. Obviously, the general public might have views on the issue, but are you suggesting that because they feel that unmarried couples should have an equal entitlement to adopt to married ones, Parliament should somehow take the view that the welfare of the child is best served in that way?

Felicity Collier: I thought that you might be interested in those findings. The actual headline that we announced in national adoption week was based on a survey conducted for us by MORI of 2,000 adults and their interests in adopting either previously or in the future. It found—this was very interesting—that 21 per cent. of adults in unmarried relationships and who declared that as one of their characteristics had either considered in the past, or would consider in the future, adopting a child, compared with 7 per cent. of married couples. We thought that that was really quite interesting and clearly demonstrated the social trend in people's current living arrangements and in the structure of society.
 We also looked at what the general public's reaction was. I have spoken to many, many people, including many MPs in the House, on the issue. However much most of us support the institution of marriage as a way of providing stability, continuity and permanence to children, the reality is that many people also know, in their experience, people living in unmarried, close, stable relationships who would also offer very good care to children through adoption. That just demonstrates the public view, as does the early-day motion of the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Ms Munn), which has currently been signed, as I understand it today, by 66 MPs.

Julian Brazier: Could we stay on the survey for a moment, before getting on to another issue?
 I read the article, and you had a good splash in the press on both points. Before you can say that it demonstrates anything, the crucial question is, was it sized for age? The age profile of unmarried couples is very different from that of married couples.

Felicity Collier: I suppose that that is why I gave you the statistics, so that you could actually look at them, but I can tell you—[Interruption.]
 The Chairman: Could we have one person speaking at a time, please?

Felicity Collier: What I can tell you—this is the bit that I extracted because I thought that it was what you might ask me—is that, looking at the attitude of people of different ages to whether unmarried couples should adopt, 75 per cent. of 25 to 54-year-olds either believed or believed strongly that unmarried couples should adopt, or were neutral but did not disagree, compared with 59 per cent. of those aged 55-plus. So undoubtedly people over the age of 55 are rather less inclined to believe that unmarried couples should adopt. One could speculate that that would be because—

Julian Brazier: I am sorry, Felicity, but could I put the question again? I think that you may have misheard me. What I asked was whether, given the huge difference between the average age of unmarried couples and married couples, the question about whether couples were considering adoption was sized for age as was your poll on attitudes. Otherwise, the disparity that you suggested on willingness to adopt could be accounted for by age.

Felicity Collier: I have the information. I could provide it for you separately.

Julian Brazier: I would be interested to see it. It is not in the pack that you sent us, but if you have it, it would be nice if it could be circulated afterwards.
 The argument put forward by the officials from the Department of Health concerned the fact that the parents have entered into a legal commitment to each other and that must be of benefit from the child's point of view. Does it not worry you at all that successive surveys have shown that there is a huge difference between the likelihood of the breakdown of an unmarried relationship where there is a child and that of a married relationship? The last Office for National Statistics survey in 1997 showed that there was an 81 per cent. chance of a married relationship still existing after 10 years and a 15 per cent. chance of an unmarried relationship still existing.

Felicity Collier: As I have said to you on previous occasions, Julian, I do not consider that those surveys are in any way typical of people who would be assessed as suitable for adopting. I want to re-emphasise what was said in your earlier evidence. People are assessed as though they were a couple if one person is living with another person and their intention is to make a joint commitment to the child, even though currently only one can be the legal adopter. A sort of fiction has materialised. I see the ADSS representative nodding in relation to that.
 What you then assess is both the longevity and the stability of their relationship and their commitment to each other. It would be very unusual, in our experience, for people who had not been in a cohabiting relationship for three years or so, or demonstrated a real understanding of the level of commitment both to each other and to the child, to be approved as suitable. 
 Indeed, many people think that the assessment process is almost too intrusive on people's relationships. I think that that is a protection in these situations. The sort of atypical people who are fairly young, have fairly brief cohabiting relationships, may have a child and then have separated are not the sort of people who are being considered as joint adopters, and it is not helpful to draw a comparison between the two.

David Hinchliffe: Could we bring in Meg Staples, who is near the ground on this issue?

Meg Staples (Adoption Manager, Nottinghamshire County Council): A number of couples whom we approve who are married have had a number of previous relationships, and in fact a number of previous marriages, but the same issues do not apply in terms of looking at them. We are being required to assess the stability of the current relationship, even though it might have been for only three years. Many of the couples who come forward who are not married have been together in a relationship that has lasted maybe 10 or 15 years and has been their single most significant relationship. They are required jointly to apply to adopt, but then they have to make a choice in the assessment about which one of them is actually going to become the adoptive parent.
 So the assessment is incredibly stringent, and I think, as Felicity said, that some couples do find that the approach that we take has been more intrusive, because we are required to meet very high requirements in terms of whether or not the relationship is strong and stable and is going to endure for the child's lifetime.

Julian Brazier: One final question, just to you, Meg Staples. Why should a couple who are willing jointly to enter into the legal obligations involved in their both adopting a child refuse the legal obligations of entering into a marriage, with all the consequences that that entails in terms of property inheritance and many other things? One does not have to take a religious view to get married. There is a perfectly good civil marriage system that has been around for a century or so. Why should people want to enter into a joint relationship of adoption, which would not be a legal commitment in that sense, with regard to a child who has had enough legal and other problems in past?

Meg Staples: Some people do not value marriage in the same way as others. They do not see it as necessary to indicate their commitment to each other. They feel that they do not need that piece of paper or ritual. Some couples are not in a position to get married, so that is not an option, but they still wish to adopt and they still wish to become parents. I think it is important for the assessment to take account of why those individuals choose not to be married, and for us to be certain that those reasons are well founded. If they are, that relationship is more than likely to be stable and secure for a child's childhood.

David Hinchliffe: Could I come in on a practical point? In a previous session, I raised the issue of the welfare principle with regard to this issue. I want to ask Miss Staples and Mr. Christie—who have practical, hands-on, day-to-day experience of this area—whether they see a problem in matching up the underlying principles of the Bill, which we all support and welcome, with this particular area, which would not allow an unmarried couple to jointly adopt in these circumstances. Mr. Christie, do you want to come in on this point?

Mr. Andrew Christie (Assistant Director, London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham): Yes, I do. I was reflecting on this from the point of view of the child. Am I not, as the child who is being adopted, being denied the opportunity to have two people who have the full responsibilities embodied in the making of the adoption order? I heard that there was some discussion, and obviously some lack of clarity, early on as to the current law or rule that would apply in the case of inheritance. To take that as an example, effectively the couple would be assessed as though they were going to act as parents. One of them may acquire, as I understand it, parental responsibility through the special guardianship order. If, through that, the opportunity to have access to inheritance rights were not conferred on the child, I would have thought that child to be potentially disadvantaged.

Meg Staples: There are other issues. If the adoptive parent dies, the child is left in an incredibly vulnerable position because the surviving partner might have taken on parental responsibility, but does not have the status of adoptive parent. For the child, that is of fundamental significance. Earlier, I referred to adoption allowances. Adoption allowances are awarded to the applicant who is going to lodge the adoption application. If that person does die, there is an issue about adoption allowances in terms of the surviving partner of the relationship. We are making significant differences in stability and security for children if we do not allow unmarried couples to adopt jointly.

Hilton Dawson: My point was answered by Felicity Collier, but I make the general point that we are not talking about anybody's right to adopt. We are talking about people's right to be assessed as adoptive parents.

Meg Munn: On the issue of the availability of adopters, may I ask Meg Staples and Moira Gibb how important it is for people who wish to adopt to have had a range of life experiences that have not necessarily been smooth and straightforward?

Moira Gibb: From my point of view, the principal reason for extending the scheme to unmarried couples is because we do not want to rule out any group, as we are very short of applicants for some of the children for whom we are responsible. That is a critical issue for us. We want people who have gone through life and experienced things that will help them to tackle some of the difficulties that they are going to face.

Meg Staples: I think that people who have rich life experiences often take a higher degree of risk in terms of the children whom we are looking to place. Therefore, the pool of adopters who are likely to take the children who are waiting are in those groups that have had experiences that make them feel comfortable about taking on the extra dimension of looking after children.

Meg Munn: What are the important factors in promoting stability for children in placements?

David Hinchliffe: The hon. Lady used to be a social worker.

Meg Munn: Perhaps I should say at this point that Meg Staples actually supervised my first assessment of my first home study. [Laughter.] This is very embarrassing.

Meg Staples: We promote stability when children can make attachments to stable adults who are going to remain there for the period of their childhood, and who are going to be able to provide for those children in terms of their physical and emotional needs. Apart from what the adoptive parents provide, which is highly significant, there are other services that the local authority and other agencies should provide in assisting in that task. That is concerned with support with education and with health, as well as with support as the adopted child becomes an adult and seeks counselling. It is also about giving support along the way, as required, and timely support.
 For many of these things, there cannot be a time delay. Children cannot wait; they need it when they need it. More and more of the children whom we are placing have highly complex needs. Those children will need extra services that are outside the remit of healing adoptive parents. Those parents can do an enormous amount, but more is needed.

David Hinchliffe: I presume, Miss Gibb, that you have not been involved in Ms Munn's career at any point.

Moira Gibb: I have no responsibility there.
 I think that it is very important to note that the Children Act report pointed out that half the children in stable placements were insecurely attached. It is very important that we do not simply see an adoptive family—or a foster family, for that matter—as the answer to children's problems. As Meg says, the services are absolutely vital. We do not understand enough about how to create that attachment, but we need to ensure that we learn from what does work and pass that on.

Felicity Collier: It is also very important to prepare children for placement properly, and to have the social work expertise and multi-disciplinary resources to help children move on from a very troubled past. Also, we should not push out too far the barriers for the sorts of children whom adopters who are proved suitable for adopting are interested in adopting. Adopters who make excellent adoptive parents to very young children may find very difficult the challenge of older children with more distressing pasts. Where you push the barriers and persuade people to take children outside their original choice, there is some evidence that those placements can fail.
 Also, there should be a realistic understanding of, and information on, the past of that child; their birth families, the baggage that they bring with them, their need to know, and contact issues. I sometimes think that adoptive parents have to be saints to be able to cope with all those issues, and we owe them our enormous respect and gratitude.

Kevin Brennan: I wish to return to the rights of non-married couples to adopt, and to the points made by you, Mr. Chairman, by the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) and by Andrew Christie. We should consider—and not just in respect of inheritance—that where an unmarried couple are not allowed to adopt and, sadly, their relationship breaks up, the child is denied the right to express a preference as to which parent to stay with. Is that not a further denial of the right of the adopted child?

Andrew Christie: I would agree. A question was asked about the risks in terms of the stability of relationships that are not underpinned by the marriage contract. The reality is that when we undertake any assessment of prospective adopters, married or otherwise, we have to give consideration to the potential for such things happening. God forbid—it is obviously something that we seek to minimise—but we must have in mind the potential consequences in circumstances where, married or otherwise, the two parents are no longer able to live together.

Felicity Collier: Could I just add one point about the commitment of the extended family on both sides? We want both sets of grandparents—the families of both parents or of both pseudo-adoptive parents—to accept the child as a member of their family. These children need a network of family members around them to promote their security.

Jonathan R Shaw: I want to bring us back to the issue of private fostering. First, I have a question for BAAF. At the beginning of Terry Philpott's report there is a dedication to Victoria Climbie, of whose tragic case we are all doubtless aware. It states:
 ``This tragic case may yet provoke a change in the law to offer greater protection to all those children who find themselves similarly cared for.'' 
Is it not true that the problem was not just that Victoria was privately fostered, but that, as the inquiry revealed, the services failed? Is not to attribute the problem to private fostering alone to play on the emotions of the issue?

Felicity Collier: I want to make it really clear that this was not cheap sensationalism. It was a very thought-out and considered response. We are not saying, and have never said, that proper approval and registration of private foster carers would have saved Victoria Climbie's life. We know that it was not apparent until after her death that she was not the daughter of the woman caring for her, who was convicted of her murder. That will probably emerge from the inquiry.
 She was being cared for by a distant relative, however, who within the Children Act 1989 would not have been counted as a relative, so, ipso facto, she was privately fostered. I might add that the woman was a virtual stranger to Victoria. 
 Why we make such comparisons is because the reasons the Climbies gave to the Laming inquiry for making such private arrangements are very typical of birth parents who have their children privately fostered. They believed that their child would have a better life, education and opportunities in the future. They believed that the carer—the great aunt—was suitable because she was well educated, had travelled and been overseas, and had money and credit cards. That may sound incredibly naive, but it demonstrates why so many west African birth parents genuinely believe, from the bottom of their hearts, that they are giving their children a better chance.

Jonathan R Shaw: So what Victoria's parents could have done, had there been a registration scheme, was ring up the local authority and say, ``Are these people okay? We've never heard of them and they could be paedophiles for all we know.'' How would a registration scheme work?

Felicity Collier: The issue of registration is that people with the same motivation of wanting their children cared for—so that the children can have such opportunities—would then know that there was a register available from which they could choose somebody. Admittedly, it is more difficult when they live in other countries. At the moment, they have to go into the marketplace and identify people through word of mouth, through people who we know are brokers or through strangers. In the past, there have even been adverts in shop windows and Nursery World. If I want my child childminded, I ask the local authority for a register of approved and suitable people, and then choose one. All we want is for birth parents who make that choice to have the opportunity of knowing that someone has been checked out—they cannot do it themselves.

Jonathan R Shaw: You are a British organisation so you cover all countries in the UK. I understand that in Scotland, under the parallel Bill to the Care Standards Act 2000, the Scottish Parliament made provisions to register private foster carers.

Felicity Collier: Yes, it did.

Jonathan R Shaw: Can you tell the Committee how that is working? Is it social services or the national—

Felicity Collier: I need to be clear. Scotland is not currently setting up a register. What is happening is that the National Care Standards Commission has to inspect private fostering arrangements and local authorities' supervision of those arrangements. That is a significant improvement on what we currently have in England.

Jonathan R Shaw: Parliament provides social services departments with the enormous task of implementing various legislation. If this legislation were passed, do you, Mr. Christie, see the measure requiring social services departments to set up a register as insurmountable?

Andrew Christie: No, I do not. Fairly recently, the chief inspector sent us a letter, which set out expectations in respect of private fostering. They were, to keep a record—we are about to be inspected, so I am sure that that will be looked at—and to promote publicity. We undertook those responsibilities and, frankly, the response was disappointing. We publicised it through health visitors to school, and so on.
 My view is that, in addition to having a requirement to register, there has to be some kind of notion of enforcement and penalty, which would apply if one did not do that. That still would not mean that everybody would come forward, but I think that it would increase the likelihood that people would, which minimises risk. That is essentially our responsibility.

Jonathan R Shaw: Is that your view, or that of the ADSS?

Andrew Christie: It is my personal view as well.

David Hinchliffe: Do you believe that, if there were penalties there, you would have had a much bigger response than you got to the advertisements?

Andrew Christie: I think that it is quite possible. Sad to relate, we have an opportunity coming up, with the publication of the Climbie inquiry, for these matters to be more in the public mind. That may be an opportunity that we should consider taking advantage of.

Jonathan R Shaw: Does the ADSS have a view?

Moira Gibb: We support the development of a register, and see this as an important gap in current protection. Obviously, we would always want to add that any new service has to be resourced, because it will fall disproportionately on a number of authorities where there has been a practice of private fostering.

Jonathan R Shaw: Has the ADSS had any discussion with the Department of Health since 1993 that you are aware of? Lord Laming was the chief inspector at that time. Has there been any further discussion about the possibility of a registration scheme, how it would work and who should do it?

Moira Gibb: I would have to check with my colleagues who lead on children and families, but I could not say that we had had discussions specifically on that point.

Jacqui Smith: I think that there is a general consensus that this is a problem that needs addressing. Where there may not be consensus is on what will make a practical difference. Referring back to our earlier evidence, a fundamental question is, why, in your experience, do people not notify about private fostering arrangements, despite the extra attempts that have been made to raise awareness? What can we do differently, in terms of registration, that would make people more likely to notify? There is a problem if we do not know where people are, and part of the argument is whether people are willing to register. What must happen to make people more willing to notify and then to comply with the registration scheme?
 We have talked about enforcement and penalty. Presumably, one reason why people do not notify is that, in an unregulated system, they are rightly concerned about what will happen if they come to the authorities' attention. Is there a risk that if we regulated the system and enforced it in the way that you mentioned, it might make people less willing to come forward? How would we overcome that?

Andrew Christie: Frankly, people come forward so infrequently, that the risk of deterring any of those is minuscule. The parallel is in the approach that is adopted to childminding. That is the closest that I can think of in terms of where there is that requirement. I think that there is quite an understanding in the community as a whole that if someone is going to childmind, they are expected to meet certain standards. People probably do not really understand the system until they actually seek to do it, but there is an expectation that they will go through a certain process.
 Probably, the reality is that there are two aspects to raising awareness and understanding. One is about publicity and information and, particularly, working in partnership with some key community groups. I am thinking of some of the parallels in our work with unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, where working in partnership with community groups representing, for example, communities from the horn of Africa, elicits a lot of information. We are well aware that the information then gets around the community, and people become better involved. That is one aspect. 
 If, at the same time—it is a fairly blunt idea—there were a few examples of an attached penalty, which people became aware of, that would be an additional incentive. I do not think that the whole thing would be closed down, but it would increase the likelihood of children being monitored. 
 Only yesterday I was dealing with a case that had come to the adoption panel. It was a private fostering placement in similar circumstances to those of Victoria Climbie. A parent had placed the children with a very distant relative. The parent was last heard of in the Congo but is now thought to be in Angola. There had been no supervision or regulation until the case came to our attention because both children had suffered serious physical abuse.

Jacqui Smith: A woman came to see me in my constituency surgery the other day. As a good member of the community, she had taken in her son's 15-year-old friend, whose parents had said, ``Out you go.'' If a registration scheme and enforcement such as you describe had already been introduced, do you think she should have registered in advance, and that she should have been punished for not registering in advance of taking that person in?

Andrew Christie: That situation is quite common and in local authorities we often work with families to try to achieve such solutions as an alternative to a child of 15 becoming looked after, which is not necessarily in their best interest. I take the point—if we came across something like that, would we want to get into the position of enforcement and so on? However, I would want us to consider providing support, advice and guidance to such families, particularly those in which younger children are placed. This raises complex issues of whether we want an age definition in such circumstances and I would have to think about that added complexity. I am thinking predominantly about cases in which much younger children are placed for long periods by parents who have no contact with those children, who have had no opportunity to express an informed view. I bet that the 15-year-old that you are talking about had an informed view of what should or should not happen and would not have been with that friend if he or she had not wanted to be there.

Moira Gibb: I do not think we have any intention of reaching out and trying to bureaucratise ordinary relationships, and the time limits would have allowed that to happen anyway. If it was going to continue as a serious placement, it might be helpful for the family taking in the child to think it through in advance. In a sense, the register and the approach that we are suggesting demonstrates the seriousness of our intention to protect some of our most vulnerable children.

Julian Brazier: May I make a point from the edge on the 80-20 principle of how to achieve something for least effort? My local police have been running a campaign for a long time and are pressing the Home Office on the issue of children sent to placements for a few weeks on school exchanges--we have a lot of that in east Kent. A voluntary scheme has been set up in east Kent to which I believe every school now subscribes. Of the first 12 providers on which police checks were made, six turned out to have convictions for serious criminal offences, or were found to be well known to social services as unsuitable for handling children. It seems that, at least in matters that are dealt with commercially, a sort of ``heads-up'' checking that picks up the worst cases fairly quickly is possible.

Felicity Collier: We know that there are many different situations, and the three that you described are three different situations in relation to private fostering. The matter is complicated, but I do not think that that is a reason for doing nothing, and we understood that the Department was developing a code of practice on language schools and so on. I shall be interested to see more evidence of what you found out, Julian, but we are worried and we think that teenagers and young people coming from overseas are particularly vulnerable. Families that seek them out may have unsuitable intentions because that is the only way they are going to have access to young people. We could have a very simple scheme of registration for people who want to care for children in those circumstances.

Hilton Dawson: Is it not the case that the average disgruntled 15-year-old can sometimes place themselves with the most appalling people? They can also place themselves with unlikely people whom further assessment can reveal to be providing a decent and sensible placement after all, thus allaying all sorts of anxieties.

Moira Gibb: There are lots of situations that are far from ideal in which children make choices for themselves, but I think we are worried not so much about 15-year-olds as about much younger children.

Andrew Love: Can I come back to Mr. Christie? I may be misinterpreting, but the impression that I get from your answers is that you think that the difference between the current notification scheme and a registration scheme, in terms of people taking it up, is that it would have to have a sanction attached. Are you saying that to be successful, the registration scheme has to have a sanction?

Andrew Christie: Is it not generally the experience that to make these things effective, there has to be some sanction attached?

Maureen Rutter: I was wondering why, to my knowledge, the LGA has not been asked if it has any ideas about how this measure could be brought about and done successfully. We are all very concerned about the whole issue, and we would definitely like something done about it, but we have not had a chance to really look at it, think about it and work it out between us. It seems to me to be an ideal subject for those of us in the children task group to look at in some depth. We could ask authorities to give their opinions and come back with a possible scheme that might at least give some cause for optimism that it could work. We are all banging about ideas now—whether this or that would work, and so on—and I do not think that we will solve the problem here in the next five minutes. This is a very good place to start, but frankly the work has not been done.

David Hinchliffe: Some work has been done. If you are saying that the LGA has not considered the matter, that may be indicative of the fact that your member authorities are not that concerned about it. I am rather surprised about that, because this has been a big issue for a long time, certainly in Parliament.

Felicity Collier: I was going to reassure you, Maureen, that we do have a private fostering special interest group of 26 people and we certainly have ADSS representatives—indeed, Andrew is our representative—and these recommendations have been developed with consultation. We have taken as practical examples some extremely good local authorities—South Gloucestershire is one—where there are very good support schemes, but we understand that how something would work requires greater consultation.
 I am delighted to have been invited to meet with the chief inspector to discuss the report and we would want to take this forward, but we want Parliament to recognise that it has the opportunity through this Bill to ensure that there is not a longer delay. For example, we are concerned about waiting for the recommendations that we believe will probably flow from the Laming inquiry on a whole range of issues, including this one, but not until next summer. There is now an opportunity to make a reasonable amendment to the Bill that will allow for the registration of private foster carers, and that is what everybody is calling for. We are now working with the two main African welfare associations, which have met with us and are supporting this also.

David Hinchliffe: We have to conclude the sitting by 1 o'clock and I am conscious that there are several areas that we have not covered. One of those is the appeals mechanism, which we have not touched on during this second part of the sitting. The witnesses presumably heard the earlier discussion about the current proposals, and of course, in a previous Parliament, we had some concerns about how they would work. I would be interested to hear the views of Meg Staples, from a practical point of view.

Meg Staples: Clearly, prospective adopters should have a right of appeal. There is some concern about them going to an independent committee if they do not have a positive recommendation on their form F. There is concern as to what the ramifications of that would be if there were financial penalties on local authorities in terms of funding the independent committee. What I think is of fundamental importance is that prospective adopters have the right of appeal. If they are finally turned down, I think that an independent review mechanism is the way forward.

David Hinchliffe: Do you think that it will be possible to satisfy individuals in circumstances in which, as we heard earlier on, it might not be possible to tell them why they are being turned down because of confidentiality?

Meg Staples: In those cases, clearly the issue is that people will not have the right to third party information that has been given. That will not be available to them. Part of the process of encouraging adopters to apply is that they understand the rules right at the beginning, and that there is some information that we will not be able to share with them, but that that which we can share should be part of their assessment and inform the final decision.

David Hinchliffe: Looking at what is proposed in the Bill, do you think that, in practical terms, people will be given more information than has been the case up till now?

Meg Staples: Speaking only for my authority, we try to give people as much information as possible anyway. That is part of the honest approach with prospective adopters that is encouraged in the standards. It is difficult for me to comment for all authorities.

Moira Gibb: I think that it is important that we do not create the sense that everyone has the right to adopt. Again, adoption is a service for children. Our experience tells us that it is very difficult for people to hear the information that is presented. Perhaps we need to be much more inventive about how we give the information. We will never be able to convey some information, and people will remain unhappy.
 Again, there is a question about how much resource we supply to adopters. It is terribly important that we give the impression that we will be fair, honest and open, but many adopters find, as was suggested earlier, the kind of inquiries that we make to be quite intrusive and they are not prepared for that. We have to be better at explaining why we make such intrusive inquiries.

David Hinchliffe: I have one or two colleagues indicating that they want to ask questions. Could they please do so briefly?

Julian Brazier: Mr. Paton made an interesting and welcome announcement, if I heard him right, when he referred to a memorandum on this issue. The main memorandum that has been circulated does not refer to it. Could that be circulated for tomorrow's meeting, when, hopefully, he will again be on standby?

James Paton: Can I clarify that? The reference that I made was to the fact that, under the new access to information provisions, where an agency decides to overrule the consent or objection, there should be access to an independent review under clause 12. That is covered in the annex to the memorandum that we sent to the Committee.

Jonathan Djanogly: I was going to make a similar point. This is, again, a question for Mr. Paton. Is clause 12 the only appeals procedure clause in the Bill?

James Paton: Clause 12 contains the provisions that would allow us to establish the independent review mechanism that we have been discussing, so, yes.

Jonathan Djanogly: What sort of things will be subject to appeal under clause 12?

James Paton: In terms of what constitutes a qualifying determination under clause 12, the Government have said that two things will be covered, and both are in the explanatory notes. One is where a prospective adopter has indicated that they are being turned down and are unsatisfied with the reasons. The other is where an agency decides to overrule a consent or objection to the release of information, which is the point that I have just clarified. The provisions are for those two purposes, but they are flexible.

Jonathan Djanogly: Could the provisions be extended? For example, they do not currently cover support.
 James Paton: They have the potential to be extended, but that is not the Government's intention at this point.

Hilton Dawson: We heard from Mr. Paton that the question of children giving consent to adoption was in the review of the 1996 Bill and that a lot of feeling was expressed against it. I would like to test Felicity's feelings on that.

Felicity Collier: The reason that there were some issues in relation to what was in the original Bill was that, through our consultation, we formed the view that children over 12 should have the right to veto their adoption and express their wishes and feeling. However, if they were required to consent to their adoption, the impact on a child of legally severing themselves from their birth parents, for whom they might still have much understanding and concern, may be so great that it would be inappropriate. On the other hand, the consultation exercise that we conducted for the Department of Health on adoption standards suggested that children and young people felt that they should have a right to say when they do not want an adoption to go ahead, or feel that these are not the right adopters for them. They have real concerns about having their voices heard.

David Hinchliffe: I thank witnesses for their evidence. Under Standing Order No. 91, governing the practice of Special Standing Committees, I must bring this sitting to a close.
 It being One o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee. 
 Adjourned till Wednesday 21 November at Ten o'clock.